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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the
Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011.
Sudan’s landmine/ERW contamination stems from World War II, the first civil war
(1955-1972) and the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The Government of Sudan’s (GoS)
Sudan Armed Forces, the SPLA/M and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW
throughout these conflicts, the last of which ended with the signing of the Agreement
on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) in 2005.
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 was adopted in March 2005,
providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to
establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The United Nations Mine Action
Office (UNMAO) was established to support the UNMIS and to coordinate all mine
action activities. The mission plan explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus
area of the UN mine action programmes. Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority was
established through Presidential Decree No. 299 in December 2005.2
The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be
that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities.
UNMAS had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and supporting the UNMIS. In
addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge of administering and
supervising contracting procedures for tasks, and for coordinating the demining assets
of the troop-contributing countries.3 UNDP, which was the lead agency for capacity
development in the UNMAO structure, started its capacity development activities in
early 2004 and ended in August 2011. In its role as lead agency for MRE within the
UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated and provided technical support, developed
training and promoted best practices.
The formal transition planning process started with a transition workshop in Nairobi in
2008, bringing UNMAO agencies and representatives from SSDA and NMAC together.
Another five transition workshops were organised by June 2011.
Over that time, the slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in
southern Sudan has been in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. One key reason
for this discrepancy may be traced to the fact that the general level of capacity is
considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in part by higher
levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, considerably
lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. As of mid-2011, UNMAO had taken the
2

Presidential Decree No. 299 (2005), http://www.sudanmap.org/DocDownload/Program/FormationoftheNationalMineActionAuthorityNMAA.pdf
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Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Kenya and Egypt are troop contributing countries that provided demining contingents to UNMIS

lead in all major elements of operations, including accreditation, tasking, quality
assurance and quality control. The weakest area in SSDA’s operations department
remains in tasking operators through the issuing of clear, concise and accurate task
dossiers.
NMAC’s operations department on the other hand became increasingly involved in
prioritisation processes, and took full responsibility of tasking procedures from 1 April
2011, with technical assistance from UNMAO.
As per the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum took place on 9 January 2011,
with 98.83 per cent voting for secession. The independence of South Sudan, declared on
9 July 2011, effectively terminated the interim arrangements, agreed to by the NCP and
the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA. Following the end of the UNMIS mandate in
July 2011, the UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS,
UNMAS continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical
support to NMAC. Following the independence of South Sudan, the UNSCR 1996 of 8
July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN as supporting the republic of South Sudan in
mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the SSDA. This new mandate
resulted in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine
Action Coordination Centre in September 2011.
The report’s main findings regarding the transition to national ownership in Sudan are
summarised as follows:
Overall findings
• The MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs, but criticised for
its weak implementation of capacity development activities. We recommend
that capacity development roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined in
relevant ToR and job descriptions and staff should be required to report on
these activities. This would help clarify who is responsible for what and it would
avoid the risk of capacity development being marginalised and viewed as an area
that is not included in “getting the job done”.
• The MAP suffered from a lack of communication and cooperation between
different UN agencies within UNMAO. We recommend the UN inter-agency
policy be reviewed, and that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the
agencies involved agree upon a memorandum of understanding which clearly
defines the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies in that specific
context. We also recommend that capacity development roles and
responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant personnel, which will
require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different roles and
responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders involved.
• There were many examples of individuals benefiting from capacity development
efforts only to leave shortly after training, resulting in a lack of continuity and

•

•

missed opportunities for the national mine action authorities to reap the
benefits from capacity development activities.
Dedication, commitment and intention to learn is key for successful capacity
development and transition. The extent and rate of progress is in the hands
of the impacted states – external agencies can only assist and support.
Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development.
Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened
trust, whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.

Specific findings and lessons learnt: NMAC
• Transition should have been made a priority at an earlier stage.
• The transition plan clarified the transition process, and the transition matrix was
an excellent tool for focussing on the activities that had to be carried out, which
element of the transition plan each corresponded to, the status of the activity,
the individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion.
• Transition processes should aim to adapt to national procedures, rather than
transferring the “UN way” of doing things.
• The capacity level of NMAC’s various departments strengthened considerably
when UNMAO staff collocated at the NMAC premises in early 2010.
Specific findings and lessons learnt: SSDA
• Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and rigorous to
ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, experience
and skills, and not on the basis of tribal or political affiliation.
• There is no clear separation between the Authority and the MAC at the SSDA.
SSDA is responsible both for broad policy decisions and for overseeing mine
action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level. To clarify SSDA’s mandate,
we recommend that the operational and authority levels be separated.
• To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from transition plans, and
to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we recommend that
future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the workshops
as possible.
• On-the-job training needs to be included in work plans and stipulated in relevant
UNMACC staff’s ToRs.
• The collaboration between NPA and UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO
playing an instrumental role in securing donor funding for NPA’s capacity
development project. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice,
and we recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in
other countries.
• Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources required for the
implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of services need
to be strengthened considerably for SSDA to assume its responsibilities.

•

We recommend that the development of SSDA’s capacity is integrated with the
national capacity development process and aligned with national development
priorities and policies.

INTRODUCTION
REPORT LAYOUT

This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the
Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011. It starts
by outlining a brief overview of key development indicators for northern and southern
Sudan4, before moving on to present the background to landmine/explosive remnants
of war (ERW) contamination, and how it was initially assessed.
A brief overview of the landmine and ERW contamination and casualty situation since
June 2011 is followed by an outline of the historical background on the Sudan MAP,
presenting key events and developments, and the normative framework. The report
then outlines the main United Nations (UN) agencies involved in the process, and their
key responsibilities.
The “transition to national ownership” chapter presents the transition planning process,
outlining key events, presenting the transition workshops and plan. The report then
focuses on the capacity development and transition process of northern Sudan. The
various departments of the national mine action centre (NMAC) are presented,
highlighting the main capacity development activities and key challenges.
The same is done with southern Sudan, before presenting findings and lessons learnt to
conclude the report. General findings related to the overall Sudan MAP are first
presented, followed by findings and lessons learnt related specifically to northern
Sudan, and then southern Sudan. Recommendations are provided in conjunction with
some of the findings when deemed relevant, and a time-line for the Sudan MAP is
provided in Annex 2.
This report does not cover the Darfur programme, as there are no National Mine Action
Authority (NMAA) structures in that region.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS5

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 2010, 46.5 per
cent of northern Sudan’s population was living below the poverty line, and the figure in
southern Sudan was 50.6 per cent. To compare, South Sudan is not faring much worse
4

This case study reviews the Mine Action Programme of Sudan, when Sudan was a unified country, comprising the
northern region and the semi-autonomous region of southern Sudan. As a result of the January 2011 referendum,
South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011. This case study mainly focuses on activities pre-independence
and therefore uses the term “southern Sudan“ when describing the southern region of Sudan. The term “South
Sudan” is used when describing any events post-9 July 2011.
5
Sources: UNDP Sudan, 2011; Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation; World Development
Indicators
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than its northern neighbour, if their respective populations and GDP are taken into
account; Sudan has 30.1 million people and a GDP of 49 billion US dollars while South
Sudan has 8.26 million people and a GDP of 13 billion US dollars.
Other key development indicators on health and education provide a more sobering
picture however. In 2010, 48 per cent of the children in southern Sudan were
malnourished, while in northern Sudan the figure was 31.8 per cent. Similarly, infant
mortality rates were much higher in southern Sudan than in northern Sudan, with the
former experiencing 131 deaths per 1,000 live births and the latter 71 deaths per 1,000
live births. In terms of education, the gross primary enrolment ration in southern Sudan
was only 48 per cent, compared to 71.1 per cent in northern Sudan. The adult literacy
rate stood at 37 per cent in southern Sudan and 78 per cent in northern Sudan. On one
hand, these indicators provide a clear picture of the development challenges faced by
northern and southern Sudan, and on the other, of the differences between the two
regions.
As will be demonstrated in this report, these differences are reflected in the
discrepancies between capacity levels between Sudan and South Sudan.
BACKGROUND TO SUDAN’S LANDMINE/ERW CONTAMINATION

Since Sudan’s independence in 1965, the country has only seen peace for a total of 11
years. Autonomy for the southern Sudan region was agreed through the 1972 Addis
Ababa agreement, putting an end to the first civil war (1955-1972). The agreement
aimed to address concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement. Despite relative
calm over the next decade, tensions between southern Sudan and the central
government in Khartoum remained. In 1983, lead by Dr. John Garang, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled against the central government in Khartoum,
initiating the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The signing of the Agreement on a
Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 paved the way for the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) in 2005, putting an end to Africa’s longest war.6
The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA/M
and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW throughout the civil wars. Landmine
contamination can also be traced to World War II, when landmines were laid along the
northern border with Libya. The second civil war was essentially a guerrilla conflict, with
the GoS holding a few garrison towns, including Juba, Malakal and Wau, and
surrounding outposts, while SPLA controlled much of the countryside in the south. The
guerrilla warfare continued throughout the second civil war, with SAF and SPLA
controlling various towns and areas of land, resulting in roads and communities along
the frontlines becoming severely contaminated with landmines/ERW.
6

While the CPA was signed in January 2005, the permanent ceasefire was signed in 2004.
http://www.un.org/chinese/ha/issue/sudan/docs/cpa-3.pdf
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Anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) landmines were used by both sides in a wide
range of areas, including key roads, towns, rural communities, around water sources
and across arable land. AT mines were mainly used on roads by SPLA/M to restrict the
movements of GoS forces and to limit access to the towns. GoS used AP mines
defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of SPLA/M forces.
Upon the signing of the CPA, Sudan emerged as a country contaminated by landmines
and ERW, making an impact on transport, socio-economic development rehabilitation
and reconstruction, and hindering the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and
refugees to their home communities.
LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY IN SUDAN

At the request of the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS) and the GoS, the Survey Action
Centre (SAC) initiated its activities in Sudan, with an advanced survey mission to South
Kordofan in 2003, in order to provide an initial understanding of the extent of landmine
contamination. At this point, landmines were perceived as a major problem in Sudan.
Infrastructure was poor or nonexistent, which, combined with the insecurity that
remained in many areas, resulted in little or no reliable available data as to the actual
levels of contamination. The Danish Church Aid (DCA) and the Sudan Landmine and
Information Response Initiative (SLIRI) were the major operators at the time. The Mines
Advisory Group (MAG), serving as SAC’s partner, implemented the first pilot Landmine
Impact Survey (LIS) in 2006, in the Eastern Equatoria State.
Through the implementation of surveys in 15 states, the LIS identified a total of 296
impacted communities in Sudan. Out of these communities, eight per cent were
categorised as high-impact, 29 per cent as medium-impact, and 63 per cent as lowimpact.7 The LIS established that the landmine problem was predominantly
concentrated in five of the 25 states located in the southern, central and eastern parts
of Sudan: Central Equatoria, Southern Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile and
Kassala. Also, all of the 25 communities were categorised as high-impact, and 71 of the
85 categorised as medium-impact were located in these five states.
Upon completion of the survey of each area, the LIS results were shared on the Sudan
Mine Action Programme website, permitting further surveys and verification of the
findings to be carried out. Between the completion of the first LIS in 2006 and 2009,
UNMAO tasked operators to implement technical surveys in 241 of the 605 suspected
hazardous areas (SHAs) identified by the LIS. Simultaneously, the implementing partners
also conducted a so-called “retrofit” - a verification of all dangerous areas recorded in
the national database since 2002.

7

Survey Action Centre, Landmine Impact Survey. Republic of the Sudan, 2009, http://www.sacna.org/pdf_text/sudan/SDN_FinalReport.pdf
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LANDMINE AND ERW CONTAMINATION IN SUDAN

UNMAO’s monthly report from June 20118 lists the following statistics in relation to
“closed hazards”9:
•
•
•

6,366 dangerous areas
188 minefields
331 SHAs

The following “open hazards” were reported:
•
•
•

719 dangerous areas
118 minefields
274 SHAs

A regional breakdown shows that 575 out of the total 719 open dangerous areas were
in southern Sudan, 42 in the western region (Darfur), and the rest in the northern
region. As for the open minefields, 57 out of 118 were located in southern Sudan, with
the rest in the northern region. Out of the total 274 open SHAs, 180 were located in
southern Sudan, with the rest in the northern region.
It is important to note that more landmines were laid in both southern Sudan and
northern Sudan in mid-2011. Volatile security situations in a number of states in
southern Sudan, particularly Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, has meant that access has
been restricted, and, as a result, the actual level of contamination of some areas
remains unknown.

LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN SUDAN

The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) recorded a total of 1,651 landmine/ERW
casualties in northern Sudan (493 killed; 1,158 injured) between 1964 and the end of
2010. Of all casualties, 1,477 or 89 per cent were male. The Landmine and Cluster
Munition Monitor10 reported 67 landmine/ERW casualties in northern Sudan in 2010. Of
the casualties, 88 per cent were male (59), and half of all casualties for which the age
was known were children, mostly boys.
12 per cent (eight) of all casualties in 2010 were female casualties: five of these were
girls. The 67 casualties reported in 2010 was an increase from 40 in 2009.
Improvements in Sudan’s data collection system and more available data, with a new
8

http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/IMSMA/IMSMAMonthlyReportJune2011.pdf
“Closed hazards” refer to tasks that have been completed, and “open hazards” refer to tasks that have not been
completed
10
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.themonitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1369
9
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national casualty database launched in September 2010, may have contributed to the
increase in reported casualties. Casualties were recorded in six states for the 2010 data,
of which three were in the Darfur region. Over half of all casualties recorded in 2010
(33) were in the state of Kassala.

LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor11 notes that a total of 4,283 casualties
(1,226 killed; 3,057 injured) were recorded by UNMAO in southern Sudan for the period
ranging from 1964 to December 2010. Of the total number of casualties, 3,076 or 72 per
cent were male and 583 or 14 per cent were female; the sex was unknown for 624
casualties.
However, the absence of a comprehensive casualty survey, combined with very poor
health facilities and inaccessible areas, have resulted in a widespread belief that there is
serious underreporting, and that the actual casualty number is considerably higher.
During the same timeframe, UNMAO reported a total of 64 casualties from cluster
munitions in southern Sudan, all of which occurred prior to 2010.
The Monitor further points out that 2010 saw 82 new landmine/ERW casualties.
Children made up the majority of all casualties (43) and 57 per cent of civilian casualties,
with boys being the single largest casualty group (36). There were a total of 17 female
casualties: seven girls, six women, and four of unknown age. Casualties were identified
in all three regions of southern Sudan and in seven of its ten states. The greatest
number of casualties occurred in the state of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, followed by
Upper Nile state, both of which border northern Sudan. The 82 casualties identified in
2010 are more than double the 38 casualties recorded in 2009. A number of factors can
explain this increase, including rise in the movement of people, as large groups of
returnees came back to southern Sudan to vote in the January 2011 referendum, and an
increased level of violence, particularly in the border areas with northern Sudan.

11

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, http://www.themonitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1496
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
PRE-CPA ERA

With the support of the European Commission and Landmine Action, the Sudan
Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was established in 2001 as a crossline project to initiate information gathering and develop a mine action plan. The
signing of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement12 in 2002 resulted in the GoS and
the SPLA/M cooperating in mine action as early as 2002. This collaboration was notable
in that it created a space for dialogue between the conflicting parties, while preparing
the grounds for peace-building, even in the middle of ongoing conflict. The Ceasefire
Agreement established an international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the
ceasefire, and opened the door for mine action activities to begin in Southern Kordofan.
At the request for assistance in mine action by the GoS and the UN in Sudan, the
UNMAS established an emergency mine action programme, the “Information
Management and Coordination for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan” in early 2002.13
The objective of this programme was to:
•
•
•

work within the confines of the pre-peace/ongoing conflict environment
develop standards, establish and document operational capacity and
professionalism of national NGOs
promote and assist the development of a national mine action planning and
coordination body that would be able to plan and cope with increased mine
action activities following any peace settlement14

With no solid peace agreement in place however, most donors were reluctant to
allocate funds for mine action operations in Sudan, which resulted in few national and
international organisations implementing mine action operations. Most of the early
activities were limited to the Nuba Mountain region (current Kordofan State), where
international actors monitored a cease fire agreement, as well as in Rumbek, the
previous capital of southern Sudan (located in the current state of Lakes).
The early engagement of UNMAS in emergency mine action assistance in Sudan was
influenced by the UN mine action policy (A/53/496/Annex II) and was in accordance
with a General Assembly Resolution on Emergency Assistance to the Sudan
(A/RES/56/112, OP.14). The details of the UN emergency mine action project were
agreed upon in a memorandum of understanding between the GoS, SPLM and the UN in

12

Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement, 2002,
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/NubaCeasefire.pdf
13
United Nations emergency mine action project in Sudan, www. http://www.mineaction.org/docs/608_.asp,
14
Report of the UN Emergency Mine Action Programme in Sudan, September 2003,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-136353.pdf
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September 2002.15 The memorandum of understanding was significant in a number of
ways:16
•
•
•

it was the first “state-wide” document that the main conflicting parties (GoS and
SPLA/M) signed
it prepared the ground for pre-CPA peace negotiations
it was instrumental for the inclusion of important mine action aspects in the
subsequent CPA17

As an operation partner of the JMC, the Danish Church Aid (DCA) implemented the first
cross-border demining activities in the Nuba Mountains in 2002. These first clearance
activities were unique, in the sense that the clearance team was composed of equal
numbers of deminers from each side of the two main conflicting parties, northern and
southern Sudan. The national organisations, JASMAR from northern Sudan, and
Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) from southern Sudan, initiated an operational
partnership, with direct supervision by the DCA.
Upon completion of the training and IMAS accreditation, the team’s first task was to
clear the main road leading to the project’s training camp. After the success of this
initial pilot project, the demining programme grew in size, and more civilians from both
sides enrolled in the basic demining course. These first clearance activities, composed of
deminers from both sides, built confidence between the two main conflicting parties,
and represented a concrete and tangible outcome of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire
Agreement.
Subsequently, the national mine action office - based in Khartoum, and the new Sudan
mine action directorate based in Nairobi, were established in 2003, with the objective of
carrying out emergency clearance operations of landmines and ERW.
In 2004, the GoS, SPLM and the UN signed the first versions of the Sudan National Mine
Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework.
These documents stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country
approach”. In the run up to the signing of the CPA, the Swiss Foundation for Mine
Action (FSD) began operations in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP)
and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in southern Sudan in February
2004, conducting route surveys on priority routes for reconstruction. The commercial
company Mechem, under contract with United Nations Office for Project Services
(UNOPS), also began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004. The Norwegian
15

Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and
the United Nations regarding the UN’s mine action support to Sudan,
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/MOU.pdf
16
Interview with Chris Clark, (former UNMAS Programme Manager in Sudan 2001 – 2002) in Geneva 30 may 2011
17
This is in line with the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action’s Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire
and Peace Agreements, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MAguidelinesper cent20ceasefire.pdf
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People’s Aid (NPA), an organisation that had been active in southern Sudan since 1986,
expanded its humanitarian programme to include mine action in 2004.
As a response to the June 2004 signature of the declaration in Nairobi, in which six
protocols were signed between the GoS and the SPLM/A, and following the adoption of
UN Security Council Resolution 154718 in June 2004, the United Nations Advanced
Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established. The UNAMIS was essentially a political
mission, dedicated to facilitating contact between the conflicting parties, and to
preparing for the expected peace support operation, following the signing of the CPA,
but did not explicitly mandate any mine action activities.
THE CPA

The second civil war between SAF and the SPLA ended with the signing of the CPA19
between the GoS and the SPLA/M in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005. The signing was
the result of more than two and a half years of negotiations between the SPLA/M and
the ruling National Congress Party (NRC). The CPA provided for an initial pre-interim
period of six months, followed by an interim period of six years. The interim
arrangement set out that the single state of Sudan should be ruled by the Government
of National Unity, and the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GOSS).
This interim arrangement is often referred to as the “one state two system approach”.
In annex 1 on “Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation
Modalities and Appendices”, the CPA includes a specific paragraph on safeguarding
“…against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance”. This
paragraph is divided into six subparagraphs, presenting issues related to the prohibition
and clearance of landmines, as well as the establishment of demining authorities in
northern and southern Sudan respectively. Paragraph 8.6.5 of the CPA states that “the
UN Support Mission, in conjunction with UNMAO, will assist the Parties’ demining efforts
by providing technical advice and coordination...” Paragraph 8.6.6 states that the parties
shall establish by D-day (signing of the CPA) + 30 days two demining authorities
(northern and southern) that shall work together and coordinate their demining
activities and work jointly in close cooperation with UNMAO.
Key milestones during the interim period include the 2009 democratic elections, and the
January 2011 referendum. The signing of the CPA, and the subsequent influx of donor
money, mainly through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) Assessed
Budget20, resulted in a significant expansion of mine action operations in Sudan. From its
18

UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004),
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/unres1547jun04.pdf
19
http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf
20
The assessed budget of UN DPKO missions are determined by UN Security Council Resolutions and are to cover the
costs of core peacekeeping functions, but do not cover all the costs within peacekeeping mandates. In Sudan, the UN
assessed budget was used for mine action activities in support of the UNMIS peacekeeping forces and humanitarian
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inception in 2003, the Sudan MAP grew to be the world’s second largest mine action
programme (after Afghanistan), with an annual budget of USD 70 million in 2011.21 22
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY

Acting upon Article 58 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 2005, and Chapter VI of the
CPA, and following Sudan’s decree ratifying the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their
Destruction (in short, the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)), Sudan’s
National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established through Presidential Decree
No. 299 in December 2005.23
Officially launched in March 2006, the NMAA comprised a national mine action
committee, a general secretariat (headed by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the
Government of National Unity (GONU), a national mine action centre (NMAC), and a
southern Sudan regional mine action centre (RMAC). The decree set out the structure of
the authority, and the structures, authorities and responsibilities of the NMAC located
in Khartoum and the RMAC based in Juba. The national mine action committee was an
inter-ministerial body, with representatives from civil society, SAF, SPLA and GoSS. The
committee exercised its responsibilities through the deputy Minister of Humanitarian
Affairs - the committee’s secretary general. The presidential decree further stipulated
that financial resources should be allocated by the government, and that the Ministries
of Humanitarian Affairs, Finance and Defence, along with other designated parties,
should take necessary measures to implement the decree. With technical and advisory
support from UNDP, mine action activities were included in the national budgets from
2006.
The RMAC changed its name to the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) through
GOSS’s Presidential Decree No. 45 in June 2006.24 The president of southern Sudan,
General Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed the appointment of a chair person, a deputy
chairperson and three executive members. The decree mandated the SSDA to formulate
and implement plans for clearance activities, and it urged it to cooperate and
collaborate with relevant national and international institutions that had expertise in
the field, while working closely with the SPLA and the SAF.

assistance. Funding from the voluntary trust fund (VTF) has been used for demining in support of humanitarian
assistance, including for mine risk education and victim assistance
(http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=who_pays_for_it)
21
UNMAO Profile 16 June 2011, http://sudan-map.org/OLD/DocDownload/Program/UNMAOprofileJune2011.pdf
22
Annex 3 provides a summary of total VTF and assessed budget contributions to the Sudan MAP from 2003 - 2010
23
Presidential Decree No. 299 (2005), http://www.sudanmap.org/DocDownload/Program/FormationoftheNationalMineActionAuthorityNMAA.pdf
24
GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45/2006, 27 June 2006, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPAper
cent20Monitor/Annexes/Annexper cent2044per cent20-per cent20GoSSper cent20Commissioners.pdf
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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
THE SUDAN NATIONAL MINE ACTION AND STRATEGIC AND POLICY
FRAMEWORK

Initially developed and endorsed in 2004, the updated National Mine Action Strategic
Framework 2006 – 201125 was prepared by a joint action team from the GoS and the
UNMIS, and was endorsed by Presidential Decree No 283 in August 2006. The strategic
framework presented the vision, mission, 11 strategic goals and 12 key mine action
priorities for Sudan. Importantly, four out of the eleven strategic goals related directly
to the transition and capacity development process:
1. Goal 4: to strengthen and expand the existing national capacities, to ensure
physical, psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of
mine/ERW victims and survivors.
2. Goal 5: to strengthen and expand the existing national mine action institutional
framework, to be able to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor all aspects of
mine action.
3. Goal 6: to develop and implement a transitional plan, to facilitate the transition
of mine action management from the UN to national authorities.
4. Goal 7: to strengthen and expand the existing national operations capacities in
mine action surveys, mine/ERW clearance, MRE and victim assistance.
The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework26 of June 2006 recalled
that the CPA stipulated that Sudan should remain united during the transitional period
until the 2011 referendum for the citizens of southern Sudan. This “one country
approach” was based on CPA’s “one country, two systems approach”, essentially
meaning unified national coordination, planning and implementation across the
country. The establishment of a NMAA was seen as essential for Sudan to be able to
fulfil its obligations under the APMBC, and to carry out all tasks at a national level, while
recognising north-south differences, as set out in the CPA. The mine action policy
framework presented 11 key principles, of which two were directly relevant to the
capacity development/transition process:
1. Principle 3: to enhance the Sudanese leadership and ownership, through
developing their skills, expertise, and abilities to plan, implement and monitor all
aspects of mine action in the Sudan within the framework of the NMAA
2. Principle 6: all mine action projects must have a strong local/national mine
action capacity building element.
The policy framework also set out the roles of key national and international actors,
25

The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework 2006 – 2011, http://www.sudanmap.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanMineActionStrategicFramework.pdf
26
The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, June 2006, http://www.sudanmap.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanNationalMineActionPolicyFrameworkJune06Egnlish.pdf
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such as the NMAC, UNMIS, UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF and national and international civil
society organisations and the private sector.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

Sudan signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction on 4 December 1997.
Subsequent to the convention’s ratification in October 2003, the Convention entered
into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. Sudan has regularly submitted its annual
transparency report as required by Article 7, and the latest report for 2010 was
submitted in April 2011.
In compliance with Article 4, Sudan destroyed all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines
before the deadline of April 2008. According to Article 5 of the Convention, Sudan
should clear all known mined areas by the end of March 2014, or else apply for an
extension. Sudan completed its stockpile destruction obligations in March 2008,
complying with its treaty deadline of 1 April 2008. Sudan also signed the Convention on
Conventional Weapons in April 1981, but has not ratified it. Sudan signed The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in March 2007, and it was
ratified in April 2009. Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM).
The SPLM/A signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of
Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action in 2001. Building on this initial
commitment, South Sudan expressed a keen interest to succeed to the APMBC shortly
after its independence, and became the 158th state party to the convention on 11
November 2011. At the time of writing, it was still unclear how the clearance deadlines
of Article 4 and 5 will be determined.
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION BILL

Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Bill27 by Presidential Decree No. 51 in March
2010. The act comprises 29 articles that are divided into four chapters:
1. Preliminary provisions.
2. National committee, national centre and regional centre, the formation
of the national committee.
3. Financial provisions and financial resources.
4. General provisions, prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines.

27

Sudan Mine Action Bill, 2010, http://sumac.org/document/resources/NMACLaw/SudanMineActionLaw2010EnglishVer.pdf
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UN FRAMEWORKS AND PLANS

The UN document Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations InterAgency Policy of June 2005, highlights various issues in relation to assistance to mineaffected states and national ownership in its “common positions” section.28 Paragraph
16 notes: “To ensure the most effective and appropriate response to the landmine
threat, United Nations mine action activities promote national ownership, institutionbuilding and capacity development, and are contingent on adherence to the core
requirements of the IMAS…” Paragraph 18 highlights that “in certain exceptional
circumstances, it may be appropriate for the United Nations to assume some or all of the
responsibilities, normally undertaken by a national mine action authority”. Paragraph
63 further notes that in programmes managed by the UN, the UN “Coordinates
development of a plan, in collaboration with national and UN partners, establishing the
milestones to be reached before management of the programmes is transferred to
national authorities”. Paragraph 64 is dedicated entirely to the transition process:
“Where the United Nations has been managing a programme on behalf of a
national or local authority, the United Nations encourages or assists the
government to develop a plan to transfer responsibility for the programme to the
national authorities, based on the attainment of agreed milestones as part of a
single and integrated strategy. The transfer process will normally be
implemented as a phased activity, as capacity is developed within the national
and local structures. The process will culminate when appropriate capabilities
exist within these structures, and the formal handover of remaining
responsibilities will be completed…” 29
The United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for 2006 - 2010 outlines the
strategic objectives and indicators for UN mine action, and is informed by Mine Action
and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy. It promotes
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and full adherence to and
compliance with relevant treaties and other international instruments, in particular the
APMBC, the convention on conventional weapons and relevant human rights
instruments. The strategy stated the following in its situation analysis: “National
ownership of mine action programmes has proven critical to long-term success”. 30 The
strategy’s objective number four was to: “Assist the development of national institutions
to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual
response capacity in at least 15 countries”. 31 The strategy presented two activities and
two indicators of achievement for this specific objective. 32
28

Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy”, June 2005, p. 3
Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, June 2005,
30
The United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010, p. 5
31
Ibid. p. 12
32
Ibid. The major activities are to:
a) Provide capacity development support to enable national mine action institutions to manage,
coordinate, and implement an appropriate response to the current landmine/ERW problem
29

12

THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK FOR
SUDAN (UNDAF)

The UNDAF 2009 – 2012 set out to provide a framework for how the UN could respond
to Sudan’s national priorities and needs in an effective, systematic and coherent way.
The overarching goal of the UNDAF was consolidating peace and stability, with four
interrelated areas of cooperation:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Peace building.
Governance and rule of law.
Livelihoods and productive sectors.
Basic services.

Mine action fell under the peace-building area, and UNDAF anticipated the following
output: “Strengthened national institutions’ capacity to prioritize, coordinate and
manage all aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation
of national and international obligations under the Ottawa Conventions (UNMAO,
UNDP)”. 33 The UNDAF further established the target of the NMAA and the Southern
Sudan Demining Commission, taking full responsibility of mine action by 2011, with
domestic mine action laws in place.
SUDAN MINE ACTION SECTOR MULTI YEAR PLANS

Sudan’s mine action sector, comprising national authorities, the UN and NGOs, agreed
in 2008 that they would together develop a multi-year plan, covering all the
components of mine action, through sector-wide consultations.
The 2006-2011 Multi year Plan34 that was endorsed by the SSDA, the NMAC and
UNMAO, was the first plan of such kind to be developed for the mine action sector in
Sudan. The purpose of the plan was to demonstrate the commitments of all the
Sudanese mine action sector partners to implement mine action activities in accordance
with the national strategic framework, and towards meeting national and international
obligations. The 2006-2011 Multi Year Plan was aligned with all relevant national
documents, as well as with the UNDAF. The process of developing the plan was based
on consultations with partners on their strategies and capacities. In line with the
transition plan, the 2006-2011 plan envisaged that all management responsibilities
would be transferred from the UN to the national mine action authorities by 2011. The
plan presents the sector response to capacity development, with a focus on two main
b)

Assist national authorities to identify appropriate national institutions and develop capacities that can
meet long term mine action requirements
33
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Sudan 2009-2012, p. 21, http://www.sudanmap.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanUNDAF.pdf
34
Sudan Mine Action sector Multi Year Plan 2006-2011,
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-Sudan-2006-2011.pdf
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areas:
1. Planning, coordinating and monitoring.
2. Quality management.
The main objectives of the plan were to:
• clarify the gaps in terms of capacities and resources against the defined and
shared targets
• make easier the tracking of resources against activities
• provide more transparency vis-à-vis donors and stakeholders
• help partners realign their strategies and activities to the common goals
• improved coordination of tasks
NRMAO staff pointed out that the process of developing the plan and the plan itself was
significant in creating a stronger sense of ownership among NMAC staff members.
The 2006-2011 plan was followed by the 2010-2014 Multi Year Work Plan35, which, as
with the first plan, was based on consultations with all actors in the Sudanese mine
action sector, with UNMAO working closely with their national counterparts. The stated
purpose of the multi-year work plan is to provide a unified planning document to assist
with resource mobilisation and planning, within the mine action sector in Sudan.
While the first multi-year plan combined north and south together, apart from in the
“mine and ERW survey and clearance” section, which was divided between the north,
the south and Darfur, the multi-year work plan has two distinct sections – one for the
north and one for the south. The plan includes specific sections for north and south
respectively, and states how on-the-job training would be the most effective solution to
address the SSDA’s need to increase practical understanding of the mine action
management processes.
It is clear that the plan has been a useful document for resource mobilisation, and for
planning purposes for the Sudanese mine action programme as a whole. While a
number of NMAC staff highlighted the value of the document, no SSDA staff members
made any reference to it during meetings for this case study. As to whether or not the
process of developing the plans resulted in strengthened national capacity, NRMAO
staff has pointed out that had the involvement of NMAC been greater, the process’
contribution to NMAC’s capacity development would have been more notable.

35

Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Work Plan 2010-2014,
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THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN
The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1590 was adopted in March
200536, providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to
establish the UNMIS. UNMIS was mandated by UNSCR 1590 to support the CPA in a
number of ways, and consisted of 10,000 military personnel and up to 750 civilian police
personnel.
Article IV of the UNSCR 1590 stipulated that the UNMIS’s mandate would be the
following: “To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation
with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian
demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination”. 37 The UNSCR 1590 explicitly
recognised the sovereignty of Sudan. The Sudan Unified Mission Plan38 stated that, in its
aim to support the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan,
the overall programme of the UN in Sudan must have “sustainability as its key objective;
allowing for a gradual shift from international assistance to Sudanese self-reliance, and
progress that is carried forward by the people and institutions of Sudan”.
The Sudan Unified Mission Plan (the mission plan) stipulated that UNMIS was to oversee
the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other mine action actors. It further stated that
“all mine action activities will be integrated into a common United Nations mine action
program, coordinated by the UNMAS”. The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was
established with headquarters in Khartoum, and three regional offices in Kadugli (with
sub-offices in Kassala and Damazin), Juba (with sub-offices in Yei, Wau and Malakal) and
El Fashir (with sub-offices in El Genina and Nyala).
The mission plan presented three key areas that the UN mine action programme should
focus on:
1. Surveying potentially contaminated areas countrywide, clearing high and
medium priority mine and ERW contaminated areas; rehabilitating the most
serious mine victims, and raising awareness of the mine and ERW situation
through MRE.
2. Clearing priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian
police components of the mission.
3. Developing national capacity through support to the national mine action
authorities and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the
north and the south.
It is important to note in particular point number three, and that the mission plan
36

UNSCR 1590 ; http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/284/08/PDF/N0528408.pdf?OpenElement
UNSCR 1590, ibid
38
Sudan Unified Mission Plan, UNMIS, http://www.unsudanig.org/unsudan/data/Sudanper cent20Unifiedper
cent20Missionper cent20Plan.pdf
37
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explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus area of the UN mine action
programmes.
The mission plan further presented three distinct phases of the mine action programme.
While not presenting any timelines for these phases, the mission plan outlined the
following key activities, for each phase:
1. Route verification, limited clearance, emergency survey/marking, quality
assurance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), battle area clearance (BAC),
targeted MRE, emergency VA and capacity building, address treaty obligations
and conduct community assessment of the impact of landmines and ERW.
2. Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), route clearance, clearance of high/medium
impact areas, quality assurance, national MRE, national VA, capacity building,
including implementation of transition plan, and establishing a fully operational
national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.
3. Complete the transitional plan, develop operational national mine action
coordination and implementation capacity, and make Sudan mine-impact free.

MAINSTREAMING GENDER CONSIDERATIONS IN UNMIS

The UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security39 calls for gender mainstreaming40 of
all peacekeeping operations. In response to this, a DPKO gender advisor participated in
the inter-agency assessment missions conducted prior to the finalisation of the
mandate for the UNMIS. In light of this, UNSCR 1590 established the UNMIS reaffirmed
resolution 1325. The UNMIS mission plan reflected the calls of UNSCR 1325, and
included a specific section on gender, and explicitly stated that “gender perspectives are
to be integrated effectively in all components of the mission…The mission will aim for its
policies, programs and activities to comply with international standards on gender
equality, and will promote gender equality and equity both internally (inside the mission)
and externally (for the Government of National Unity, Government of Southern Sudan,
UN agencies and civil society)”. The mission plan further emphasised the need to ensure
that the discharge of the UNMIS mandate was in accordance with international
standards, and the UNSCR 1325, which makes an explicit reference to mine action,
“Emphasising the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness
programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls”.

39

UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 2000, http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf
Gender mainstreaming refers to “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
action including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the
concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit
equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality” (report of the Economic
and Social Council for 1997(A/52/3) 18 September 1997

40
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The DPKO’s Under-secretary General’s General Policy Statement on Gender
Mainstreaming41 of March 2005 provided an operational framework for implementing
gender mainstreaming mandates in DPKO’s work. The policy statement requires that all
peacekeeping functional units design guidelines to facilitate gender mainstreaming. In
response to this, UNMAS developed the Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, in 2005,
with an updated version published in 2010. The guidelines present advice on how to
mainstream gender in the main areas of mine action, highlighting concrete examples
from affected countries. The extent to which a gender perspective was truly integrated
into the mine action component of the UNMIS is questionable, and it is evident that the
gender guidelines for mine action programmes have not been implemented. Many of
the informants interviewed for this study were not even aware of the guidelines,
indicating that they have not been disseminated in any meaningful way.

41

DPKO’s Under-secretary General’s General Policy Statement on Gender Mainstreaming, March 2005,
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/policystatementrvs.pdf
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
UNMAS

The UN Inter-agency Policy specifies that UNMAS - a division of the DPKO – is the focal
point for mine action in the UN system. The policy further sets out that in specific
peacekeeping, complex emergency and rapid response settings, UNMAS can establish
and manage mine action coordination centres (MACCs). In relation to capacity
development, UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning for the transfer of
programme management responsibilities to national authorities, and, in cooperation
with other UN mine action team members, to advise governments on the development
of mine action institutions and legislation as well as to assist in developing capacity and
institution building plans.
The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be
that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities.
As mentioned above, the Sudan Unified Mission Plan stipulated that UNMAS should
coordinate all mine action activities, integrated into a common United Nations mine
action programme. UNMAS have had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and
supporting the UNMIS. In addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge
of administering and supervising contracting procedures for tasks identified by the
steering committees, comprised of UNMIS, the UN country team and the Sudanese
Government. UNMAS was also responsible for coordinating the demining assets of the
troop contributing countries.42

UNDP

UNDP was the lead agency for capacity development in the UNMAO structure, as per
the Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-agency Policy
document, which stipulates that “The United Nations Development Programme provides
comprehensive support to national mine action programmes in the full range of mine
action activities, at the request of mine-affected countries”. 43 The UN Inter-Agency
Policy explicitly states, that; “UNDP capacity development support aims to assist
national and local authorities to: develop laws, policies and national and sectoral
strategic plans; deliver all elements of mine action efficiently and to IMAS; establish
comprehensive information management systems necessary for the efficient planning
and prioritisation of mine action activities and ensure the quality of mine action
operations; explore cost-effective alternatives to clearance operations based on
humanitarian and socio-economic impact analysis; advocate for the inclusion of mine
action in national development plans; and meet their legal obligations under relevant
42

Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Kenya and Egypt are troop contributing countries that provided demining
contingents to UNMIS
43
The United Nations: Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Policy”, June 2005,
p.18
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international conventions”. 44
UNDP’s capacity development activities in Sudan started in early 2004. The first phase
of the project (2004 – 2008) focused on establishing legislative frameworks, developing
basic organisational infrastructures, including the set up of head/field offices of NMAC
and SSDA, as well as training staff members in basic mine action management. The
second phase of the project (2009 – 2011) aimed to provide comprehensive
management, technical, material and financial support to the NMAA and the SSDA, to
consolidate and strengthen their existing institutional, management and technical
capacities to be able to plan, coordinate, monitor, accredit, quality assure, manage
information, and implement all other aspects of mine action within the framework of
the IMAS and the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs). The UNDP mine
action programme and capacity building project was managed at the national level.
Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, the project was
executed under UNDP’s direct implementation modality, in both Khartoum and Juba,
and was located within the Crises Prevention and Recovery unit of UNDP.
A UNDP senior technical advisor was based in Khartoum between 2005 and 2010, where
he spent time in both the north and the south, overseeing five technical advisors, who
worked at different times in southern Sudan between 2006 and 2011. The last UNDP
technical advisor, based in Juba, was on a UN volunteer’s contract. The reason for
downgrading the position was partly due to funding shortages, and partly due to a
broader strategy to recruit and place volunteers in various government departments in
order to develop capacity. The UNDP noted that the high turnover of technical advisors
in Juba impacted negatively on its ability to effectively provide sustained capacity
development support to the SSDA. Stated reasons for the high turnover have involved
the challenging working conditions in Juba and difficult working relationships between
UNDP and UNMAS personnel.
The 2007 Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and
Development Project 45 presents the following four recommendations, addressing the
requirements for:
1. A realistic long term needs assessment, to provide the basis for:
a. An appropriate long term strategy for the national mine action
programme, which will allow:
b. Realistic plans for further development of Sudanese mine action
capacities and for transferring responsibilities from the UN to
national authorities, and finally:
c. Plans by the international mine action organisations (NGOs as
well as the UN agencies) for supporting capacity development.
44 Ibid, p. 35
45
GICHD, Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action capacity Building and Development Project, October 2007
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From August 2011, the UNDP was no longer involved in any capacity development
activities for the SSDA or the NMAC. Despite numerous efforts, it was not possible to
obtain an official explanation as to why UNDP ceased its capacity development
activities. An unofficial explanation pointed to a combination of funding issues and
clashes between UNMAS and UNDP staff members in Khartoum and at headquarters. A
former UNDP staff member stated that UNDP “had enough of being constantly
overruled by the more powerful and resourceful UNMAS”.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF)

In its role as lead agency for MRE within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated
and provided technical support, developed training and promoted best practices.
UNICEF further supported “the MRE advisory group”, composed of a number of expert
agencies and individuals who provided guidance to the sector, while identifying ways of
improving effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of MRE within the broader mine
action community.
In relation to capacity development, the UN Inter-agency Policy states that; “In all its
work, UNICEF seeks to build the capacity of its local and international partners to
undertake effective mine action projects. Consistent with its main focus of work, UNICEF
works to develop effective mechanisms to coordinate MRE projects, such as establishing
national MRE working groups, undertakes MRE and associated training activities for
practitioners, in addition to providing direct technical assistance to government and
other national partners”.46
A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme however, highlighted that
UNMAS “had to hire” its own MRE advisors to provide support, as a result of a
perceived “lack of interest” on UNICEF’s part. When UNMAS received funds for MRE,
the intent was for the funds to be transferred to UNICEF, to hire regional MRE
coordinators for Kadugli and Juba. The evaluation team further argued that internal
rules regarding support costs meant that it was not possible for UNICEF to accept the
funds to hire the two international coordinators. UNMAS then reportedly requested
UNOPS to hire them for the programme. A UNICEF staff member provided a different
perspective, pointing out that a lack of interest was not an issue, but that the UNMAS
negotiated terms and conditions made the transfer of funds to UNICEF impossible.
UNICEF further mentioned that UNMAS hired two regional coordinators, despite
concerns raised by UNICEF, and that the subsequent arrangement was worked out as a
compromise.
UNOPS recruited the two regional MRE coordinators in 2005, and in order to ensure
coordination of the MRE programme throughout the country, UNOPS and UNICEF
46
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agreed that the UNICEF MRE coordinator in Khartoum would coordinate the activities of
the two MRE regional coordinators. UNICEF had been providing an MRE coordinator to
the UNMAO office in Khartoum since April 2005, but the coordinator reported both to
the UNMAO programme manager and the UNICEF chief of child protection. This dual
reporting obligation was described as a “confusing arrangement” by the coordinator.
UNICEF had a close collaboration with NMAC’s MRE department in Khartoum, with the
coordinator actively involved in developing the MRE element of the transition plan.
At the time of writing, UNICEF supported two international and eight national NGOs
financially, to provide MRE activities in southern Sudan. In collaboration with the SSDA,
UNICEF also supported the printing of a “teacher’s guide”, which is integrated into the
primary educational curriculum. UNICEF has further provided logistical support to the
SSDA in the form of vehicles to regional offices and the Juba head office, as well as
laptops, a projector, and digital cameras. UNICEF also supports the SSDA through joint
field visits to monitor field activities, and through organising special mine awareness
campaigns.

INTERNATIONALLY ORGANISED MINE ACTION MANAGER TRAINING
COURSES

Many of the middle and senior managers at NMAC and SSDA have participated in one or
more of the internationally organised mine action manager training courses provided at
Cranfield University (UK), James Madison University (USA) and Amman University
(Jordan). Many of the NMAC and SSDA staff members rated the courses and the value
created by interacting with colleagues from other mine action programmes, sharing
lessons learnt and good practices. A number of international staff however, questioned
if these courses really add any value.
Cranfield Mine Action, part of the Centre for International Security and Resilience within
Cranfield University, has been providing a range of training courses for national
managers in order to develop national capacity to enable the Sudan MAP achieve
national ownership in a timely manner. The most recent course, conducted in April
2010, included training on applied quality management, mine action project
management, resource mobilisation, and process improvement. Recipients of the
training included representatives from NMAC, SSDA, as well as Sudanese national NGOs.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the effectiveness of internationally
organised mine action training courses, a number of evaluations have been carried out,
including one commissioned by the GICHD in 2007.47
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
THE TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS

In response to the updated 2006 Mine Action Strategic Framework’s strategic goal no. 6,
to develop and implement a transitional plan in order to facilitate the transition of mine
action management from the UN to national authorities, UNMAS - through UNOPS recruited a transition planning officer in late 2007. The officer’s key responsibilities
included developing a transition plan and an exit strategy in consultation with national
authorities, and managing “the whole transition process”, from the development of a
plan to its implementation, in close cooperation with other stakeholders.
TRANSITION PLANNING WORKSHOPS AND PLANS

The transition planning officer initiated the formal transition planning process, with
support from Cranfield University, with a first transition workshop organised in Nairobi
in late February 2008. This was behind the timeline set out in the strategic framework,
which stipulated that the UNMAO and the NMAA “shall jointly develop and endorse a
transitional plan, including clear milestones by December 2006”.
A “transition framework” was developed at the Nairobi workshop, identifying a number
of functions and components.48 The intention was for the framework to be used to map
the different actions and capabilities of the NMAC and the SSDA. Additional work on the
transition framework was carried out by the transition planning team, based in
Khartoum and Juba, through the identification of key elements of national ownership,
the identification of a number of core components for each element, and the
development of criteria for national ownership for each component.
A second workshop was held in Nairobi in May 2008, at which a monitoring tool to track
levels of national ownership was developed, and an agreement on developing transition
action plans was made. The third transition workshop in Khartoum in August 2008 took
stock of progress made in developing the action plans to support the transition to full
national ownership. After this workshop, it was agreed that transition should be
approached with the ten core management responsibilities of a mine action programme
as a starting point:
1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action.
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities.
3. Accredit mine action organisations, in accordance with the NTSGs, prior to
authorisation of mine action activities.
4. Quality manage all mine action activities.
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5. Revise NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions, that all concerned
are obliged to adhere.
6. Maintain the integrity of the IMSMA.
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve
mine action strategic goals.
8. Coordinate and manage the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a
priority basis.
9. NMAC shall coordinate and manage the implementation of mine victims
assistance to ensure physical and psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and
reintegration of landmines/ERW victims and survivors.
10. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty
and other relevant treaties.
A fourth transition meeting was held in Juba in November 2008, with the key objective
of presenting the transition plan, agreeing its structure and the relationship between
transition and capacity development, and discussing its implementation and activities in
2009 and beyond. The importance of monitoring and evaluating capacity development
training activities was also agreed upon. The participants further decided that a
memorandum of understanding between the UN and the NMAA should be developed,
and that the starting point for the implementation of the transition plan should be 1
January 2009.
The fifth transition workshop was held for two days in Khartoum in May 2010. Cranfield
University assisted with facilitating the workshop, and representatives from UNMAO,
UNOPS, NMAC and SSDA participated.
Participants were divided into two separate groups - NMAC staff members and their
UNMAO counterparts in one, and SSDA staff members and their UNMAO counterparts
in the other. The two groups first worked separately, reviewing progress made in
relation to the level of national ownership in the various elements as set out in the 2008
transition plan, and then got back together for general discussions and reporting. The
workshop was essentially structured around the following five areas:
1. “Where were we before?” December 2008 levels of national ownership in the
three main areas: clearance, MRE and VA
2. “Where are we now? Current operational plan until June 2011”.
3. Transitioning the ten core management responsibilities.
4. Performance indicators.
5. “Making the multi-year work plan ours”.
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The workshop is summarised in a “fifth transition report”. The fifth transition plan49
presented nine core management responsibilities instead of ten:
1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action.
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities.
3. Revise the NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions to which all
concerned are obliged to adhere.
4. Manage the quality of all mine action activities.
5. Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with NTSGs, prior to
authorisation of mine action activities.
6. Maintain the integrity of IMSMA.
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve
mine action strategic goals.
8. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty and other
relevant treaties.
9. Plan, coordinate and manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine
action programme.
As can be seen, the previous core management responsibilities related to coordination
and implementation of MRE activities (previously responsibility No. 8), and to
coordinating and managing the implementation of victim assistance were deleted, while
the additional responsibility of planning, coordinating and managing support services
was added.
The fifth transition plan was divided into the above mentioned nine core management
responsibilities of the Sudan MAP. These responsibilities were referred to as
“elements”, which were subdivided into components; each of the elements was divided
into a common structure, outlined and described; then an end-state for that specific
component was presented.
The report presented five levels of national ownership for each component, with level 0
corresponding to no national capacity to carry out responsibilities, and level 4
corresponding to the highest level of national ownership. The reader could also see at
which level of national ownership the MAP was set in 2008 (indicated in orange), and
which level it was believed the programme had reached in 2010 (indicated in blue).
Following a description of the different levels of national ownership, there was a
summary of the situation in June 2010, followed by an outline of activities deemed
necessary in order for the NMAC/SSDA to reach the next level of national ownership.
Each component ended with an estimate of which level of ownership the NMAC/SSDA
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would reach one year later (June 2011).
THE TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS:
NORTHERN SUDAN

Following the third transition workshop in 2008, the first transition matrix was jointly
developed by the northern region mine action office (NRMAO), the UNDP and NMAC.
The development of the matrix was seen as necessary, as it was generally believed that
the transition plan was too complex, complicated and academic to be practically
workable.
The matrix set out specific timelines in relation to what needed to be achieved, and it
stipulated the specific responsibilities of the various actors involved, highlighting
concrete activities that had to be undertaken in order to reach the goals. It is believed
that the development of this transition matrix made the capacity development process
less academic and theoretical, concretely highlighting instead what needed to be
achieved, by when, how, and who should be responsible. This was an important shift in
the capacity development process – from an academic approach to a more practical and
pragmatic approach, one that was more easily understood by all stakeholders involved.
The shift to a more pragmatic approach strengthened the relationship between NRMAO
and NMAC, as NMAC became increasingly involved in quality assurance visits.
Many NMAC respondents indicated that the transition process was unclear to them
prior to the May 2010 fifth transition (T5) workshop. It is worth pointing out however,
that very few of the NMAC and NRMAO staff that participated in the workshop had
been involved in the earlier transition activities of 2008. Some staff members remarked
that they doubted transition “would ever happen”. However, all NMAC and NRMAO
respondents pointed out that the workshop was a “great success”, remarking how the
workshop resulted in a “much clearer” picture of the activities that were necessary for
the transition to national ownership to successfully take place. Staff members further
underlined that the workshop strengthened the relationship and level of trust between
NMAC and NRMAO, providing a strong foundation for closer collaboration between the
two organisations. It is evident that the T5 represented a key event in the
transition/capacity development process.
Subsequent to the T5 transition plan, a matrix of transitional activities was developed
jointly by NMAC and NRMAO staff. The matrix presented the various pillars, activities,
what elements of the transition plan the activities corresponded to, the individual(s)
responsible, and deadlines. The matrix was an essential document, as it made more
concrete the transition plan, clearly presenting the activities which were needed for
each area, and importantly, indicating who was responsible for which activity, by when.
It essentially answered the questions: Why, What, Who, When?
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CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE NMAC
Mine Risk Education Department

The MRE department was consulted in the drafting process of the transition plan, and
staff members remarked that capacity development was only really initiated as a
structured process with the T5 transition plan. Respondents from the MRE department
pointed out that high staff turnover represented an initial challenge for the department
up to 2009, and that this negatively impacted on its capacity level.
From mid-2010, the MRE department has had close collaboration with NRMAO, with
one NMAC MRE staff member working at the NRMAO office. Key capacity development
activities carried out until late 2010 included joint NRMAO – NMAC teacher training
activities and field trips, “learning by doing” through in-house training, participation at
international meetings, and attending international training courses.
Both NMAC and NRMAO staff members remarked that the January 2011 collocation of
NRMAO at NMAC improved NMAC’s general skills tremendously, mainly as a result of:
•
•
•
•

on-the-job training
strengthened coordination
improved information sharing
day-to-day discussions and interactions

NMAC successfully chairs the MRE working group on a monthly basis at the NMAC
premises, highlighted as a key achievement. A multi-year work plan was developed
jointly by NMAC, NRMAO and UNICEF, with the intention of serving as a planning
document post-June 2011. NMAC co-tasked all MRE activities in collaboration with
NRMAO, and an NMAC signature on all tasking documents was made obligatory.
The T5 transition plan set out five different elements for the MRE department, some
with corresponding subcomponents, nine in total. The level of national ownership was
fairly balanced among the nine components, with most of them seeing national
ownership at level two or three. Key activities included training in the following areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•

external reporting responsibilities
survey and needs assessment methodologies
data analysis techniques
prioritisation processes
proposal writing
planning capacity

While the MRE capacity at NMAC in Khartoum is generally regarded as strong, with two
MRE associates and one head of department, staff members pointed out that there are
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no MRE capacities in the sub-offices, due to a lack of qualified staff members.
Recognising this, NMAC head office identified a number of activities aimed at
strengthening capacity at the sub-offices, where NMAC staff usually travel on a more
frequent basis. However, issues such as a lack of fuel and functional vehicles regularly
represent key challenges to this. Limited commitment from relevant ministries involved
in MRE was also underlined as a key constraint. Other significant challenges related to
fundraising, and the sustainability of activities.
While NMAC’s MRE department expressed a keen interest in mainstreaming gender
considerations, and showed a fairly high level of awareness of gender aspects related to
MRE, the staff were not aware of UN’s Gender Guidelines for Mine Action
Programmes.50 It appears that these guidelines have not been disseminated in any of
NMAC’s departments.
Victim Assistance Department

The victim assistance (VA) programme was established at the NMAC headquarters in
2007, through funding from the human security trust fund. NRMAO and NMAC have
worked in parallel since its initiation. NMAC works closely with the Ministry of Social
Welfare and Social Security, which is the ministry officially in charge of VA and broader
disability issues in Sudan. NRMAO and NMAC were instrumental in advising on the VA
part of the national strategic framework in 2007.
NMAC, in close collaboration with NRMAO, established the VA working group, which
consists of 18 NGOs. This working group meets once a month. As of mid-2011, there
were three VA staff members at NMAC, but no capacity at the subregional level. A grant
from CIDA provided the bulk of the funding from 2008 to June 2011.
A key aspect of capacity development activities has been on-the-job training, carried out
by the collocated NRMAO VA expert. Needs assessment activities concluded that
training was needed in the following areas: Technical writing with a focus on planning,
resource mobilisation, monitoring and evaluation and reporting. Since these areas were
of relevance to other NMAC departments, joint training sessions were organised with a
number of departments. A key area of attention in the capacity development process
has been on the information management cycle, focusing on data collection, storage,
quality assurance and analysis.

Key achievements of the VA department include:
•

successfully organising workshops related to the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) at state level
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•
•
•
•
•
•

developing and using a questionnaire to evaluate and monitor outcomes of VA
projects at the beneficiary level (presently elaborating a M&E system)
drafting and disseminating annual and quarterly VA reports
a VA victim registration form has been developed and the database has been
developed, verified and is working
victim data has successfully been entered into the database, which is currently in
use
data has been collected from NGOs and rehabilitations centres, with the aim of
centralising all VA data in a database
being fully in charge of reporting obligations under Article 7 of the APMBC

It is important to note that responsibilities related to VA activities will eventually be
taken over by the Ministry of Social Welfare, incorporating victim assistance into the
broader disability programme. This is in line with paragraph 13 of Article IV of the
Cartagena Action Plan, which stipulates that “victim assistance should be integrated into
broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks related to disability, health,
education, employment, development and poverty reduction, while placing particular
emphasis on ensuring that mine victims have access to specialised services when needed
and can access on an equal basis services available to the wider population”.
Support Department

As mentioned above, participants at the T5 workshop recognised that support services
were not reflected in the transition plan, resulting in the inclusion of one additional key
management component - “support services”. It was agreed that support services
should include administration, logistics, finance, resource mobilisation, IT and external
relations. Element 9 of the transition plan set out that “NMAC shall plan, coordinate and
manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme in northern
Sudan”.
Key activities to develop capacity in NMAC’s logistics department included:
•
•
•

training the logistics officer in rules and regulations of donors in relation to
procurement, asset and fleet management
establish logistical systems (database, stock taking, asset management, fuel
monitoring, request systems and internal auditing systems)
attaching the NMAC logistics officer to the UNMAO logistics department

In addition to these activities, the development initiative (TDI) seconded a consultant to
NMAC’s logistics department through the NRMAO. Upon the establishment of the
logistics department and the arrival of the TDI consultant, the set-up of a vehicle
management system and asset tracking were made key priorities. Issues related to
effective and efficient fleet management were highlighted by staff members working in
the logistics department as critical challenges. In particular, concerns were raised
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related to NMAC’s capacity to cope with a large number of additional vehicles upon the
closure of UNMAO in June 2011, as well as the lack of funds to insure them.
In relation to the administration component of support services, the following activities
were carried out in order to strengthen capacity and to prepare for national ownership:
•
•
•

reviewing NMAC’s organisational chart, and all staff members’ ToRs
conducting on-the-job training in administration
Human Resources auditing and reporting (NRMAO staff worked closely with
NMAC staff in these areas)

Key activities deemed necessary for strengthening the finance element of support
services included NRMAO advising on relevant procedures to meet international audit
requirements. Building trust among international donors in order to ensure sustained
funding was mentioned as an important task for NMAC.
Information Management Department

The sixth element of the core management responsibilities as stated in the transition
plan relates to Information Management: “Maintain the integrity of Information
Management System Mine Action (IMSMA)”. The Information Management (IM)
element was mainstreamed into the clearance, MRE and VA pillars of the transition
plan. The T5 report states that IMSMA was one of the “most disputed” topics during the
T5 workshop. The T5 report also highlights that “…IMSMA is the only category where
everyone agreed there is a real problem”. One of the key explanations for this was that
the capacity development process had been initiated late in the IMSMA department. In
light of these challenges, participants at the T5 workshop agreed that NMAC’s IMSMA
department should be more closely integrated into the NRMAO’s IMSMA activities, and
it was believed that the merging of NMAC and NRMAO during the next demining season
would significantly strengthen NMAC’s level of capacity in the area. NRMAO’s IMSMA
technical advisor highlighted one key recommendation during the T5 workshop: The IM
national staff from NRMAO should be transferred to the mine action authorities during
the transition period.
Staff members in the IMSMA department pointed out that it was not very clear what
the capacity development and transition goals were in 2008. On-the-job training
activities were initiated in 2009 however, and the capacity development and transition
goals became clearer in 2010. Since March 2011, the main focus of the on-the-job
training within the department has been on the “IMSMA package”. A NRMAO IMSMA
expatriate staff member acted as an advisor to the NMAC IMSMA department. A
considerable part of the on-the-job training was carried out through an experienced
Sudanese NRMAO IMSMA staff member, working closely with NMAC. This strategy was
proven to be highly successful, as cultural and linguistic aspects made the collaboration
effective, resulting in strengthened capacity.
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Despite improvements however, the NRMAO and NMAC IMSMA staff members
expressed that “more time is needed for confidence building”. On-the-job training
focused, among other things, on the “customisation” of IMSMA to the future needs of
the country, if necessary; “training the trainer” activities were also carried out, to
ensure that NMAC’s IMSMA department has the ability to train newly recruited IMSMA
staff members as well as other NMAC staff members in IMSMA.
IM and IMSMA were pointed out to be “very much integrated into operations”, with
IMSMA staff members working closely with the operations and MRE departments. The
NRMAO technical advisor, pointed out that the capacity development work was “very
time- consuming”, and that it often was challenging to find the right balance of “doing
training and running the show”. The technical advisor further mentioned that it would
be premature for all UN support to be terminated with the closure of UNMAO in June
2011, highlighting a need for continued external support in relation to guidance,
technical assistance and monitoring of progress.
The availability of sex and age disaggregated accident data is a precondition for enabling
the identification and awareness of the distinct exposure to risks that women, girls,
boys and men commonly face due to their gender specific roles and responsibilities. This
information can in turn allow for MRE activities to be more effectively tailored and
targeted. As a state party to the APMBC, Sudan has committed to collect and analyse all
data in a sex and age disaggregated manner by the Cartagena Action Plan’s action point
number 25.51 The information management department displayed a high level of
awareness of the importance of storing and presenting data in a sex and age
disaggregated manner whenever relevant, and accident data was presented in this way
by default.
Operations Department

As of June 2011, NMAC’s operations department comprised a total of eight staff
members, including three from the NRMAO, collocated in its office. The department
highlighted the goals of full ownership and Sudan meeting its APMBC Article 5 clearance
obligations at the 2010 T5 workshop. It was noted that although transition to national
ownership would mean that the UN would play a supporting rather than implementing
role, continued UN presence at the NMAC, providing technical assistance and resource
mobilisation would be critical for the continued capacity development of NMAC.
In order to structure the capacity development activities, the operations department
developed a plan of action, outlining timelines, milestones and indicating which
individuals were responsible for what activities.
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Key focus areas of capacity development at the operations department included:
1. Prioritisation
a. NMAC co-chaired the prioritisation process for the 2010 – 2011 season
b. All three sub-offices took the lead in the prioritisation process at the suboffice level for the 2010-2011 work plan
2. Tasking
a. NMAC increased its involvement in tasking procedures from 1 January
2011, through directly tasking implementing agencies
b. The NMAC operations office took full responsibility of tasking procedures
from 1 April 2011, with technical assistance from NRMAO
3. National technical standards and guidelines (NTSGs)
a. NTSGs were reviewed and adapted to country specific requirements in
October 2010, and were published on the Sudan MAP website
4. Accreditation
a. Indicators, outlining to what percentage NMAC should be involved in
accreditation and quality assurance activities were agreed upon, and an
“accreditation schedule” was completed and shared with sub-offices
Three NRMAO operations staff members were collocated with the NMAC operations
department in January 2011. From January on, NMAC’s operations officer worked very
closely with NRMAO’s regional operations coordinator, gradually taking on more
responsibilities. Capacity development aspects were included in the NRMAO regional
operations coordinator’s ToR, but was not a key focus of his work, as he mainly
supported the activities of UNMIS.
NMAC operation’s staff recalled that it was only when the collocation of NRMAO with
NMAC took place that the “real transition” started, underlying the need for continuing
technical assistance, and that the exchange of experience is key. Planning and
contracting were highlighted as areas in need of continued capacity development
through practical experience and on-the-job training.
It is worth noting that NMAC and NRMAO were collocated from the very beginning of
the establishment of the Kassala sub-office in 2006. The successful collocation at the
sub-regional level influenced the push for the collocation of NRMAO with NMAC at
headquarters level in Khartoum. The NMAC Kassala sub-office was “running on its own”
from early 2011, with one expatriate staff member providing technical assistance when
needed. The NRMAO Damazin sub-office was located within the UNMIS base. NMAC
quality assurance officers spent two days per week at the NRMAO office, benefiting
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from on-the job training and technical assistance.
Key operational challenges for a post-transition NMAC were pointed out to include
tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and control. It was further mentioned that
the NMAC budget, as of June 2011, only covered office and some of the salary costs,
and no operational activities related to tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and
control. A 2012 grant that has been issued to NMAC will reportedly cover these gaps.
The salary discrepancy between UNMAO and NMAC national staff was highlighted as a
key challenge in absorbing staff with relevant technical skills and qualifications into
NMAC.
One example clearly illustrates this discrepancy: A UNMAO national operations quality
assurance (QA) assistant, level 3, receives a monthly salary, all inclusive of about 2,900
Sudanese Pounds, while the equivalent position at NMAC receives a monthly salary of
SDG 1,000. Not only was it difficult to absorb UNMAO staff members with relevant
experience and knowledge, but the salary discrepancy also resulted in difficulties in
retaining them; “it is impossible to retain trained staff at NMAC”.
In terms of the extent of the contamination, the operations department pointed out it
has an up-to-date and accurate understanding of it, and that a strategic plan is in place
to implement its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 by 2014.
As regards the residual contamination, NMAC noted that the plan is for the SAF to deal
with it. Discussions between NMAC, NRMAO and MAG resulted in an agreement on
NMAC establishing a mine action hotline number 1912 (free of charge, similar to 999),
from 1 January 2012.52 Community members can call the hotline number whenever
they come across any landmine/ERW contamination. The hotline phone number is
based at the NMAC, and will cover all of Sudan, it is funded by MAG and managed by
NMAC. It can be dialled from all mobile networks operating in Sudan and is free of
charge. Every call will be received and registered by NMAC, and calls reporting a mine,
an item of unexploded ordnance, or any suspicious object, as well as reports of mine
related accidents, will be passed to the field offices that will take appropriate actions to
identify the threat and task relevant assets to eliminate it.
With regards to national clearance capacities, the JIDUs (part of the Joint Integrated
Units (JIU)) were created as a result of the signing of the CPA and include deminers from
southern and northern Sudan. These deminers were initially seconded from the army
but then came under the supervision of the High Commission for Mine Action (a group
of ministries led by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission). They were trained at the
Nairobi training centre as humanitarian deminers and equipped with the necessary
equipment. The JIDUs were closely integrated into NMAC from 2009 onwards.
The JIDU were given a desk accreditation as an integrated mine clearance team (IMCT)
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by UNMAO in 2010, followed by an operational accreditation and a test field, funded by
the British Embassy in Khartoum. As a result of the accreditation, there has been an
increased interest among previous donors to continue the support they had previously
provided and help create a sustainable humanitarian demining capacity capable of
conducting independent mine clearance operations that comply with IMAS.
The JIDUs were provided by the CPA and, as such, ceased to exist on 9 July 2011. They
were renamed the National Demining Units (NDUs) after July 2011, and they continue
carrying out humanitarian demining, coordinated by the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry
as and when funds are available.
The Way Ahead

Following the end of the UNMIS mandate as per UNSCR 199753 in July 2011, the
UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS, UNMAS continued
providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC.
Following the termination of UNMIS and the closure of UNMAO, the main activity of
UNMAS in Sudan (UNMAS-S) is to continue assisting the NMAC in the implementation of
mine action activities in the country, to promote the humanitarian and developmental
goals of the government.
The current areas of assistance are inline with the Sudan Mine Action Programme MultiYear Work Plan and the transition plan. NMAC and the Humanitarian Affairs
Commission have identified, through the transition planning process initiated in 2008
that the main competencies where the NMAC would like continued UN support are:
•
•
•
•

operations and quality assurance
IMSMA
MRE
resource mobilisation

Support will continue, based on a regular monitoring and evaluation system agreed
upon with NMAC.
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS IN NORTHERN SUDAN
The Danish Church Aid

As previously mentioned, DCA was the first international operator involved in clearance
in Sudan in 2002, from the very beginning working in close partnership with national
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organisations JASMAR (the Sudanese association for combating landmines) and
Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). The first ever cross-border demining training
course, organised by DCA, was attended by JASMAR and OSIL.
JASMAR and OSIL were DCA’s implementing clearance partners until 2005, when
significant financial and organisational challenges resulted in DCA taking over all
clearance teams from the two national organisations. DCA pointed out that JASMAR and
OSIL were struggling to establish themselves as fully independent NGOs, and that OSIL
in particular was very poorly funded. While the national organisations may have had a
good level of technical capacity in terms of clearance, DCA highlighted that they lacked
capacity in other areas that are essential for an organisation to operate independently,
such as finance and logistics.
Both JASMAR and OSIL had MRE teams working directly with the DCA since 2003 up to
2011. These teams were working closely with DCA’s multi-task teams, providing
community liaison (CL) and MRE support during clearance operations.
In addition to the above activities, DCA provided capacity development support to
JASMAR, in the form of logistical, finance and English language training. DCA also
provided vehicles and IT equipment, as well as financial contributions to JASMAR. DCA
staff pointed out that JASMAR had increasingly developed into a self-sustained NGO,
and that improvements in the running of the organisation were very evident.
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan

The Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR) started its activities in Sudan in 2006, and
has had a partnership agreement from the very beginning with the Sudanese
organisation Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO). AAR and FPDO
initially focused their activities on developing MRE material. AAR opened a sub-office in
Kadugli, South Kordofan in 2007, and started developing MRE sessions. AAR shared this
office with the FPDO from the very beginning, and FPDO delivered MRE on an
independent basis.
AAR has highlighted that it focused its capacity development activities with the FPDO in
the following areas:
•
•
•

MRE training
IT skills
administrative related work

AAR also conducted workshops and gave trainings to other national NGOs, with a
specific focus on material development. AAR provided training to a staff member at the
NMAC MRE department, through regular on-the-job training in MRE development,
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three days per week.
In terms of FPDO’s general level of capacity, AAR has pointed out that it is “quite good”,
and the main capacity challenges are reported to be in the administrative and financial
areas.
Mines Advisory Group

While not having had any formal capacity development activities with NMAC, the Mines
Advisory Group (MAG) did focus on strengthening the capacity of its clearance teams,
with the long term view of “handing them over” to its national partner organisation
JASMAR. Leaders of the various clearance teams underwent training to be certified at
EOD level 3, and MAG also conducted an EOD level 2 training course in Khartoum in
August 2011. There were 23 staff members from JASMAR/MAG, the NDU and the NMAC
who became certified at EOD level 2. Medical training was also provided to seven
medics, qualifying them to provide emergency medical support for Humanitarian Mine
Action (HMA) operations.
MAG signed a memorandum of understanding with the NDU in May 2010, following
from which five deminers were seconded to MAG to be trained and accredited as a
multi-task team. The team was trained in manual clearance, BAC, and technical and
non-technical survey. Soon after, a second team was seconded to MAG to be trained in
the operation and maintenance of a Bozena IV mechanical asset and mechanical
preparation techniques. The team has since also been trained and accredited in the use
of mechanical assets. Based on the successes of MAG’s partnership with the NDUs,
MAG has also run CL and MRE projects with JASMAR, as well as providing training and
support for its programme staff. JASMAR seconded CL staff to MAG to benefit from the
expertise provided by MAG’s technical team, and MAG benefitted greatly from
JASMAR’s extensive experience delivering MRE projects in the region. In May 2011, the
national community liaison manager and MAG/JASMAR MRE trainer were sent on a
programme learning and exchange visit to Lebanon, where they shared constraints,
achievements and lessons learned with both MAG’s Lebanese programme, and the
Lebanese NMAA.
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TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: SOUTHERN
SUDAN
THE SSDA

The Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) is responsible for:
•
•
•
•

broad strategic policy decisions
responsibilities that are usually associated with a NMAA
for overseeing mine action at the operational level
for managing day-to-day mine action activities, a role commonly associated with
a mine action centre (MAC)

IMAS 02.10, the Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme54 clearly
describes the responsibilities of these different authorities, and recommends a clear
division of the two. SSDA has three sub-regional offices, located in Malakal in Upper Nile
State, Yei in Central Equatoria State, and in Wau in Western Bhar El- Ghazal. Most
respondents noted that the capacity is very low in these sub-offices, and it was pointed
out that they are severely under-resourced in terms of staff and equipment.
TRANSITION TEAM

Following the news that UNDP would cease its mine action activities, UNMAS initiated
the idea of creating a transition team in 2010. The principal aim was to implement the
transition plan and to carry out capacity development activities with SSDA. The
transition team, as of June 2011 was made up of representatives from three different
organisations: UNMAS, NPA and UNDP.
As from mid-2010, two staff members from the UNMAO team were directly involved in
capacity development: one UNDP UN volunteer (UNV) who was permanently located at
the SSDA premises, and one UNMAS technical advisor, who spent considerable time
working with SSDA’s senior management team. Together with the NPA capacity
development team (consisting of two expatriate staff and two national staff), these staff
members represented the “transition team”. Key responsibilities and activities were
agreed upon by the transition team members. It was further decided which key external
partners the various transition team members were “responsible for”, and each
transition team member was assigned a SSDA counterpart.
THE T5 WORKSHOP

The slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in southern Sudan is in
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sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. This can be explained by a number of factors,
including lower levels of education among the population, poorer infrastructure and
greater impacts of the conflict at all levels of society.
While the T5 workshop, held in Khartoum in May 2010, was hailed a “success” by most
UNMAO and NMAC representatives, a distinctively different perspective was given by
SSDA staff members and other southern Sudanese participants. Recognising the “one
country approach” stated in the CPA and other key documents, the reasons for
organising the T5 workshop in Khartoum, bringing southern and northern stakeholders
together, are understandable. It is, however, evident that the format of the T5
workshop resulted in problems. Numerous southern Sudanese T5 participants were
highly critical of the workshop, and of the fact that it was organised in Khartoum.
One senior SSDA staff member referred to the T5 workshop as a politically driven
“window dressing” activity - adding little real value to SSDA’s capacity development and
transition process. Another senior SSDA staff member highlighted that T5 was a
“success” for the north, but a “disaster” for the south. One senior UNMAS staff member
who worked at the UNMAO head office at the time pointed out that the combination of
new senior staff members at UNMAO in Juba, limited resources, and the politically
driven motives linked with the “one country approach”, resulted in the decision to
conduct the T5 workshop jointly in Khartoum. Recognising the shortcomings of this
decision, however, the same staff member also confessed that “in hindsight, it was a
mistake to have north and south together”. When asked about the accuracy of the
levels of national ownership agreed upon in Khartoum, this same staff member
remarked that they “didn’t want to wash the dirty laundry in public”, presumably
referring to the fact that the low level of capacity at the SSDA was overlooked.
THE T5 TRANSITION PLAN

There was a lot of criticism on the T5 transition plan. Firstly, many pointed the great
delay in its completion, and that it was not made available to the SSDA (nor the NMAC)
until February 2011, despite the workshop taking place in May 2010. One senior SSDA
staff member argued that the transition plan was “mainly an UNMAO document”, with
very little consultation from SSDA staff members besides the chairperson. According to
him, the chairperson was the only one “who was allowed to talk” during the T5
workshop, resulting in the subsequent transition plan being based on “assumptions” –
not accurately reflecting the reality in southern Sudan.
Another senior SSDA staff member pointed out that “how the transition plan stipulates
the capacity development and transition process does not happen on the ground”. A
senior UNMAO staff member working in Juba at the time pointed out that about a
dozen SSDA staff members attended the T5 workshop, and that a meeting was
organised shortly after returning to Juba, in order to confirm what had been decided in
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Khartoum. At this meeting, it turned out that SSDA staff did not agree with much that
had been decided at the T5, resulting in an additional four meetings. The UNMAO staff
member highlighted that these four meetings resulted in an “as close to agreed
language as we could get”. It was further underlined that the considerable delay in
drafting and distributing the T5 transition plan lead to SSDA “buying out”, to a large
extent disassociating themselves from what had been agreed.
Another key criticism raised by many was the lack of indicators for the different levels of
national ownership, at times resulting in highly subjective interpretations of what the
different levels mean.
Likewise, expatriate representatives who were involved in the capacity development
process believe the plan had serious limitations. For instance, one individual argued that
the transition plan essentially was a “political document”, while explicitly pointing out
the problems related to lack of indicators. Echoing criticism from SSDA staff members, a
number of expatriates pointed out that the transition plan was not realistic, and that it
was difficult to use in a practical way. The T5 transition plan and the corresponding
process have been criticised by some individuals as being “too academic” and “too
theoretical” – not “tailored to the reality” of the Sudan mine action programme.
Information obtained from respondents involved in the transition process clearly
indicates that the T5 transition plan was not actively implemented in southern Sudan.
None of the individuals interviewed during the research mentioned they had actually
used the transition plan. One SSDA staff member argued that the lack of
implementation of the transition plan was the result of “a lack of cooperation between
the SSDA and UNMAO”.
THE SIXTH TRANSITION WORKSHOP

As per clause 2.555 of the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum, organised
jointly by the GoS and the SPLA/M provided the women and men of southern Sudan
with the opportunity to either confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system
of government established under the CPA or to vote for secession. The referendum took
place as scheduled on 9 January 2011, and the results that were published on 7
February 2011 showed that an overwhelming majority (98.83 per cent) voted in favour
of secession. The vote for secession and the subsequent independence of southern
Sudan, declared on 9 July 2011, effectively terminates the interim arrangements, agreed
to by the NCP and the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA.
The sixth transition workshop (T6) was held in Juba in June 2011. Following the outcome
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of the referendum in southern Sudan, the workshop focused exclusively on the
transition process in southern Sudan. NMAC and UNMAO representatives were
therefore not present. The workshop was organised by UNMAO’s technical advisor, with
GICHD assisting with facilitation. The workshop brought together representatives from
GoSS, the UN, NGO partners and other stakeholders. The aim of the workshop was to:
•
•
•

review the progress made since the 2010 T5 workshop
take stock of current levels of national ownership, compared to those identified
in the T5 transition plan
identify key activities necessary to move to the next level of national ownership

Workshop participants were divided into three groups, tasked to discuss three different
“sections”:
•
•
•

clearance
MRE/VA
support

Review discussions during the T6 revealed that SSDA’s levels of national ownership, as
agreed upon during the T5 workshop, far from accurately reflected the reality on the
ground. One key reason for this discrepancy could be traced to the fact that the general
level of capacity is considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in
part by higher levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly,
considerably lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. The high levels of national
ownership agreed on during the T5 could therefore have been a result of
representatives from southern Sudan feeling intimidated in comparison with their
northern counterparts. With new UNMAO staff members in the south, it was hard for
them to accurately verify the levels indicated, since they were new to the context
themselves. A number of individuals have highlighted these as plausible explanations as
to why such exaggerated levels of national ownership were accepted.
Recognising the shortcomings of the T5 workshop and of the subsequent plan, it was
clearly emphasised from the very start that the T6 workshop should aim to result in
agreed levels of well thought through national ownership, and accurately reflect the
reality on the ground. Discussions during the T6 workshop made it clear that numerous
aspects of the transition plan had not been fully understood by many of the SSDA staff
members. Also, the lack of SMART56 indicators for the different levels of national
ownership (level 0 “lowest” to level 4 “highest”) resulted in varying and highly
subjective interpretations of the different levels.
While most levels of national ownership corresponding to the different elements of the
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transition plan were actually put back one or two levels, at least the T6 workshop
resulted in a more realistic picture, reflecting the actual level of national ownership
within the SSDA. Understandably however, the fact that many elements saw the levels
of national ownership being brought back one, and sometimes even two steps, meant
that many SSDA staff members were discouraged, since many felt they had made
efforts and could see visible improvements in some areas. It was therefore important to
point out that the “modification” of some levels should not be interpreted as a static
situation at the SSDA, but rather as a result of a misleading starting point.
CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITES OF SSDA
MRE and VA Department

SSDA’s MRE/VA department is fairly small, with three staff members, including the
director. Generally speaking, SSDA’s capacity to carry out its MRE responsibilities is very
low. The T6 transition plan includes a total of eleven components. The T6 workshop
determined that the level of national ownership corresponds to level 0 in two out of the
eleven components, level 1 in seven out of the 11 components, level 2 in two cases.
The SSDA has no capacity to task MRE activities or to conduct needs assessments and
analysis to support the MRE programme. One of the key achievements of the MRE
department appears to be that it organises the MRE working group on a monthly basis
and has been hosting it at the SSDA premises since May 2010. UNMAO reported that, in
collaboration with UNICEF, it developed a matrix stipulating MRE activities, and that this
was used as a basis for the MRE work plan. It is unclear however, to what extent this
activity matrix has been useful and implemented by the department.
Key challenges that were pointed out referred to the generally low level of competency
and skills of the staff members, as well as a lack of ability to communicate within the
department and with key stakeholders in a professional manner. The extent to which
on-the-job training activities have been carried out appears to be very low, with fairly
limited interactions with UNICEF and UNMAO.
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) is the
Ministry responsible for disability issues in South Sudan, and VA falls under this broader
responsibility. SSDA’s present role and responsibility in VA is mainly related to
information sharing activities. Together with the MoGCSW, the SSDA co-chairs the
monthly VA/disability working group meetings at the physical rehabilitation centre in
Juba.
Support Services Department

The transition team focused its capacity development efforts in the support section on
institutional capacity development, aimed at clarifying the SSDA structure; which staff
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members have which positions, and their specific roles and responsibilities. The
transition team clarified the organogram in 2010, and terms of reference (ToR) were
developed for each of the eight departments, and for all the different staff positions.
As of June 2011, the SSDA had a total of 96 staff members on its payroll. The T6
workshop made it obvious that the roles and responsibilities of many SSDA staff
members were unclear, and that, in too many cases there is confusion as to which
departments and in particular, staff members are responsible for which activities. It
therefore appears that the time and energy invested in developing and clarifying the
roles and responsibilities among different departments and staff members have
resulted in very limited, or no, visible improvements on the ground.
Capacity assessment questionnaires were also developed by the transition team in
2010-2011, with the aim of establishing the level of capacity of the different staff
members and to clarify where the capacity gaps were the greatest.
With the objective of strengthening the administrative and financial procedures within
the SSDA, a total of 52 forms were developed in collaboration with the SSDA director of
administration and finance. As a direct response to very poor attendance levels of SSDA
staff members, a monthly attendance sheet was one of the many human resources (HR)
forms that were developed, in the hope that this form should serve as a basis for the
issuing of salaries. The extent to which this form has been implemented however,
seems to be fairly limited. On-the-job training on how to complete these forms was
provided to relevant staff members in the Juba office and in the sub-regional offices of
Yei, Wau and Malakal.
There appears to have been very little collaboration between UNMAO and SSDA in
relation to resource mobilisation activities. The SSDA programme director, who in
theory should be responsible for fundraising activities at the SSDA, informed she has not
collaborated at all with UNMAO’s programme officer who is involved in resource
mobilisation. The resource mobilisation capabilities within the SSDA appear to be at
best, very low and at worst, nonexistent.
Information Management Department

Component 6.1 of the transition plan relates to information management, and describes
it as: “effective data entry and verification, collation, management and secure storage of
mine action data”. As in the north, IMSMA is the system that is used to enter, manage
and store mine action data in South Sudan. The transition plan stipulates the end state
for component 6.1 as: “Using IMSMA, mine action data is managed and used in an
efficient and effective manner”.
Participants at the T6 workshop agreed that, in order to reflect the reality, SSDA’s level
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of national ownership in information management should be brought back from level 2;
“SSDA is managing and using mine action data, yet not done in an efficient or effective
manner, and further improvements need to be made”, to level 1; “SSDA’s capacity to
manage and use mine action data is being developed”.
The rationale for setting the level of national ownership to correspond to level 2 in May
2010 is hard to understand, as level 2 depends on a parallel IMSMA being up and
running. SSDA has all necessary hardware for utilising IMSMA effectively, but a lack of
regular supply of electricity has meant that as of September 2011, no parallel IMSMA
was established at the SSDA. As of October 2011, the United Nations Mine Action
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) was therefore still fully responsible for managing all
mine action data in southern Sudan, with most external stakeholders going directly to
UNMACC for information and/or maps.
As in the operations department, NPA has been a key partner in the capacity
development work of the information management department, providing IT and
IMSMA courses and ongoing on-the-job training. NPA’s regional information
management advisor is based in the NPA office located in the SSDA compound. When
NPA started its capacity development project in mid-2010, a hardware/resources needs
assessment of SSDA’s IMSMA department was carried out. As a response to the
findings, NPA assisted in purchasing necessary equipment. A needs assessment looking
into competencies and skills was carried out on an ad hoc basis. NPA informed that its
activities have mainly responded to UNMAO’s capacity development suggestions. NPA
started its information management training activities more or less “from scratch”,
focusing on basic computer literacy, and familiarised the staff members with the most
commonly used IMSMA forms, such as survey and completion forms, and the
corresponding process of how to complete them. NPA and UNMAO’s IMSMA
department have been collaborating in their capacity development efforts, planning and
making decisions together.
The main weaknesses of SSDA’s IMSMA department were highlighted to include lack of
practical experience in using IMSMA and analysing data. Main strengths highlighted by
NPA include the willingness and eagerness to learn and a high level of commitment.
Until a parallel IMSMA has been installed at the SSDA, NPA will focus its capacity
development activities on training the IMSMA staff members in quality assurance and
data entry, using a “dummy IMSMA”. The aim is to familiarise the staff members with
the process of report entry and quality assurance, as a preparation for the “real”
IMSMA.
In terms of the level of capacity in the various areas of information management, it has
been pointed out that data entry is the area where the SSDA is the most advanced,
whereas there is still need for training in reporting, mainly due to lack of opportunities
to practice. The important analysis part of information management has not even been
42

touched upon. One of the main problems appears to be the lack of practical
opportunities to actually use IMSMA, apart from data entry activities at UNMAO. As
argued by NPA: “The guys have had no opportunity to show anyone how good they
are”.
Operations Department

The capacity level of SSDA’s operations department is weak in many areas. As of mid2011, UNMAO was taking the lead in all major elements of operations, including
accreditation, tasking, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). A number of
cases illustrate a keen interest and a high level of motivation among some SSDA QA
officers in learning new skills and taking on more responsibilities. However, SSDA’s
operations department’s ability to effectively, efficiently and professionally manage all
the operational aspects of the mine action programme remains very limited. The
weakest area in SSDA’s operations department is in tasking operators through the
issuing of clear, concise and accurate task dossiers.
As of June 2011, SSDA had no capacity to task and manage mine action activities. The T6
transition plan stipulates that this capacity would be developed throughout 2011 and
2012, mainly through an increased involvement of relevant SSDA staff members in
tasking procedures. The transition plan further sets out that SSDA’s operations
department should be trained in task dossier development. The plan also stipulates that
“SSDA will create and manage tasks by at least 50 per cent by September 2012”.
Whether this is a realistic goal remains to be seen.
As to the quality management of operations activities, a QA system has been developed
and introduced by the UNMAO, and SSDA QA officers collaborate with UNMAO to
conduct QA activities. There are examples of excellent collaboration between SSDA QA
officers and UNMAO operational staff, both in Juba and in Yei. The success of these
collaborations appears to be rooted in motivated individuals, largely dependent on high
levels of commitment and interest from both sides, resulting in effective on-the-job
training. It is clear that these success stories reflect high levels of individual
commitment, motivation and interest, rather than a high level of institutional capacity.
Key actors have recognised that that an in-depth knowledge of mine action is a
necessary precondition for the SSDA to effectively carry out accreditation and quality
management activities in compliance with the NTSGs. The T6 stipulates that this will be
achieved through an integrated field-based training programme, along with on-the-job
placements with UNMAO and implementing partners. The key areas this on-the-job
training focuses on include:
•
•

general mine action assessment
technical survey
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•
•
•
•
•
•

BAC
manual clearance
mechanical clearance
MDD
EOD
clearance survey and post-completion survey

Joint reconnaissance activities with the aim of supporting the development of an
implementation plan that fully responds to task dossiers is currently underway, and will
continue with the goal of SSDA, leading joint reconnaissance exercises with technical
assistance of the transition team by June 2012.
Upon the request from the UNMAO technical advisor and chief of operations, the
commercial company Mine Tech International (MTI) offered four weeks’ “integrated
mine action” training to five SSDA QA officers in March 2011. The course covered the
following areas:
•
•
•
•
•

overview – MRE
field visits – integrated mine clearance
planning
asset deployment
threat assessment

According to MTI, the SSDA staff members’ performance during the course was very
mixed, with a varying degree of commitment. Three out of the five participants passed
the course. The fact that this training came out of a request from UNMAO suggests
there is good collaboration between different actors in southern Sudan, indicating that
there is a commitment to collaborate in developing the capacity of the SSDA.
Commercial company G4S has also been involved in on-the-job training, through field
placement of SSDA QA officers in G4S operations for an extended period of time.
Residual Capacity

As of mid-2011, there was no concrete plan in place for how to deal with residual
contamination, specifying what capacities would be necessary and who would be
responsible. Recognising that new minefields are still being discovered, and that new
landmines are being laid in a number of volatile states including Unity and Upper Nile, it
is understandable that the focus is still on how to deal with the known contamination in
the most effective and efficient manner.
Respondents from both SSDA and UNMNAO have highlighted that the most effective
and logical ways of dealing with a future residual threat would be through police and/or
SPLA EOD teams. There have already been discussions between the UN, SSDA and SPLA
44

in relation to plans for SPLA to deal with residual contamination. It was highlighted that
one option could be to have an international commercial company training the SPLA.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

NPA started its operations in southern Sudan in 1986, with a focus on food security,
health care, development of local communities, as well as training programmes for the
local population. NPA established its mine action programme in Yei, South Sudan in
March 2004, carrying out clearance and survey activities.57
NPA is the NGO that has been most heavily involved in capacity development activities
with the SSDA in southern Sudan, and it also has a long history of close support to the
SPLM. NPA started its capacity development project with SSDA in mid-2010, after being
approached by UNDP’s technical advisor at the time. UNMAS played an important role
in helping NPA secure Canadian funding for the capacity development project, with
senior UNMAS staff liaising with the Canadian donor, emphasising the need for
additional capacity development efforts.
This example illustrates the good collaboration between key actors in the capacity
development process in South Sudan. UNDP requested NPA to assist in training SSDA
QA and operations officers, training IM staff and implementing the IMSMA, IT support,
and providing advice to the SSDA management staff members on a daily basis. NPA MA
and UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding, and two NPA staff members
started working in the capacity development project in 2010, setting up a container in
the SSDA compound, in order to encourage a close working relationship with SSDA staff
members. NPA initially started with one expatriate capacity development advisor, one
expatriate IM staff member, and three national staff members. In collaboration with
UNMAO, NPA was mandated to implement the following training activities for relevant
SSDA staff members:
•
•
•
•
•

manual demining training course, including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
training course level 1
EOD training courses level two and three
relevant quality assurance and operations courses
“on–the-job” training during quality assurance visits with UNMAO
IT and IMSMA training to SSDA IM staff members

NPA’s second phase of capacity development activities with the SSDA runs from 2011 to
2013, with the long term objective that SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine
57
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action authority/mine action centre that coordinates all mine action activities and
stakeholders in South Sudan. From 2011, NPA has coordinated all capacity development
activities closely with UNMAO and the transition team, with the aim of “corresponding
directly to crucial institutional functions of the national mine action authority as
identified in the Transition Plan and as part of the collaborative efforts of the Transition
Team”.58 During the second phase, NPA is focusing its activities in the following areas:
•

•

•
•
•

institutional capacity building: NPA to provide logistics, finance and
administration courses in accordance with IMAS and requirements from GoSS
and UNDP in implementing Element 9 of the transition plan
quality assurance and operations management: NPA to provide on-the-job
training and field attachments in accordance with IMAS and NTSGs, in close
collaboration with UNMAO, commercial mine action companies and mine action
NGOs
IM and IMSMA: NPA to provide information management training to all SSDA
field offices
NPA to incorporate gender, sexual exploitation and anti-corruption in its training
activities. Training to be conducted by a national partner organisation
land release: NPA, in collaboration with the GICHD, to provide a selected
number of SSDA staff members with knowledge on how land release
methodology can be implemented in South Sudan

Mines Advisory Group

MAG has been operational in southern Sudan since 2004. While MAG has not been
involved in direct capacity development/transition activities with the SSDA, the
organisation has supported its national partner organisation Operation Save Innocent
Lives (OSIL) since 1998, with the aim of strengthening the national mine action capacity.
Since 2009, MAG has, in collaboration with CHF, implemented a 3-year project that aims
to develop the capacity of OSIL. The project aims to develop OSIL’s capacity at three
different levels – mine action, livelihoods and organisational development. OSIL has
been involved in mine action since it started operating in South Sudan, and has, over
the last few years had an operational focus on MRE/CL activities. MAG’s capacity
development activities in this project included the following activities:
•
•

expand OSIL’s level of capacity in CL activities, through training and “handing
over” a fully trained national community liaison manager (NCLM) and CL team
develop OSIL’s technical expertise through training and “handing over” a fully
trained national technical field manager (NTFM), a manual demining team and a
mechanical team
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Since March 2010, MAG also implemented a second project, focusing exclusively on
capacity development.
MAG organised a level 3 EOD course in Juba in July 2010. A total of 38 participants
attended the course, with 18 participants successfully completing it. One of the key
objectives was for the course to directly contribute towards building the country’s
national capacity to coordinate, implement and monitor mine action activities.
Danish Demining Group

The Danish Deminign Group (DDG) started its activities in southern Sudan shortly after
the signing of the CPA in 2005, and has since the beginning focused on MRE, low-tech
EOD, BAC and stockpile destruction. In line with DDG’s global development, a new
programme focusing on armed violence reduction (AVR) activities started in 2009. Since
the second half of 2011, the organisation has intensified the community focus of its
mine action activities, using a “village-by-village approach”, thereby increasing the
number of community based tasking and prioritisation.
As with MAG, DDG has not been directly involved in developing the capacity of the
SSDA. However, the organisation organised a level 3 EOD course jointly with NPA in
early 2011. Around 20 southern Sudanese representatives from southern Sudanese
NGOs, SSDA and UNMAO participated in the course. All four SSDA representatives who
participated passed.
In mid-2010, DDG’s donors started demanding a more explicit capacity building
component in DDG’s activities. As a response to this, DDG looked into possibilities of
initiating capacity development activities with SSDA, and was more or less told by
UNMAO and NPA that “they had that covered”.
Rather than starting capacity development activities directly with SSDA, DDG reached
out to the national NGO Operation Landmine Action and Victim Assistance (OLAVS), and
initiated a capacity development collaboration.
OLAVS is a renewed organisation of the Sudan Landmine Response (SLR), a national
organisation that used to work closely with Halo Trust, until allegations of corruption led
to the break-up of the partnership. Key activities include the training of one EOD and
one MRE team (mainly through on-the-job training).
At the time of writing, the MRE team was accredited, and the EOD team was awaiting
accreditation. DDG believes that these activities have been quite successful, judging by
the accreditation of the MRE team. What has been more challenging however, has been
the attempt to develop the OLAV’s institutional capacity. The main reasons for this were
pointed out to be a general disorganisation, a low level of ownership, and a low level of
capacity.
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Swiss Foundation for Mine Action

As highlighted previously, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) was one of the
first operators involved in the surveying and clearance of roads in southern Sudan,
contracted by the World Food Programme (WFP). FSD entered into a partnership
agreement with national organisation Sudan Integrated Mine Action (SIMAS) already in
2004. Funding was secured in 2006, to enable capacity development activities of SIMAS.
FSD ceased its operational activities in late 2007, and focused exclusively on providing
technical advice and capacity development assistance to SIMAS, through the presence
of international advisors, in programming and finance. This lead to strengthened
capacity in operational areas, resulting in UNMAO accreditation of a SIMAS clearance
team in 2007, after which SIMAS carried out clearance operations independently. As of
mid-2011, SIMAS had one mine clearance team, one EOD team and two MRE teams.
Following the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, SIMAS changed its name to
South Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service.
The GICHD

The GICHD organised a workshop on international humanitarian law for SSDA in Juba in
April 2011. The workshop was convened to address the content of the APMBC, the CCM
and the CCW. Some 15 SSDA staff members participated in the workshop, including the
director and deputy director, the operations manager and the legal advisor.
In late 2010, the GICHD was requested by the SSDA, UNMAO and NPA to provide land
release training, which it carried out in April 2011. The training was conducted in
cooperation with UNMAO and NPA, who also provided instructors for the training. The
four-day training covered the key areas of the land release process, and was attended
by about 15 SSDA staff members from various departments. The GICHD’s information
management section has provided continuous IMSMA support to the SSDA.
GICHD also assisted with the facilitation of the three-day sixth transition workshop, held
in Juba in June 2011.
POST-INDEPENDENCE: WAY AHEAD

The 2011 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) is an outcome of the collaboration
between a number of actors. The key aim of the plan is to guide government and donor
spending in South Sudan.
The SSDA, with assistance from UNMAO and UNDP technical advisors, was part of the
security working group in the drafting of the plan. A total of 17 institutions were
involved, and one individual who was involved in the entire drafting process, pointed
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out that the SSDA representatives were among the top three in terms of quality of
input, reliability and participation. The SSDP drafting process provided the SSDA with a
good opportunity to strengthen the visibility of mine action, and to clarify mine action’s
importance in South Sudan’s development. Mine action falls under the conflict
prevention and security pillar, which sets out to “free the country from the impact of
landmines and ERW”. The document indicates that national authorities will “conduct
and coordinate mine action activities to support the safety of the citizens and the socioeconomic development of the country”. Planned outcomes include:
•
•
•

the release of 1,306 hazardous areas for resettlement, agriculture, grazing and
road construction
the reduction of mine action accidents through mine risk education activities
the provision of physical rehabilitation services, psychological support and socioeconomic reintegration of mine victims

The SSDP articulates sectoral capacity development requirements, and is accompanied
by a Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy59 which sets out to provide a
strategic framework for organising capacity development efforts in support of GoSS’
state building objectives.
The UNSCR 1996 of 8 July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN in supporting the
republic of South Sudan in mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the
SSDA. The resolution authorises the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to
perform the following tasks; “Supporting the Government of the Republic of South
Sudan in conducting demining activities within available resources and strengthening
the capacity of the republic of South Sudan Demining Authority to conduct mine action
in accordance with International Mine Action Standards”60 i. This new mandate resulted
in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine Action
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) on 1 September 2011.
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South Sudan Development Plan – Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-426709.pdf
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/documents/sres1996_2011.pdf, 8 July 2011

49

FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE
SUDAN MAP
OVERALL FINDINGS
SUDAN’S CHALLENGING CONTEXT AND THE MULTIPLE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF UNMAO

The Sudan MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs and for enabling
the transportation of humanitarian assistance on verified, safe roads rather than by air,
saving millions of dollars. The opening of key routes also facilitated the safe
resettlement of IDP and refugee returnees. A 2008 evaluation of EC – funded mine
action programmes in Africa concluded that,
“… in spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest
level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UN
MA Service (UN and its partners) have done an excellent job in establishing mine action
operations and coordinating these through UNMAO”. 61
The MAP has also been recognised for its significant contributions to peace building,
particularly in the early days. It is generally recognized that the Sudan MAP has had to
operate in a challenging, highly political context, in combination with having to deal
with poor infrastructure with limited access to many areas due to volatile security
situations, flooding, no roads or a combination of all. Many UNMAO staff have pointed
out that the focus has been on “getting the job done”, essentially meaning carrying out
as much clearance as possible, in support of the UNMIS, as well as carrying out the
responsibility of coordinating all operators.
A 2007 external evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme concluded that the
biggest weakness in the programme was capacity development. Likewise, 2010 multidonor evaluation62 of support to conflict prevention and peace building activities in
Southern Sudan underlined the following:
“Where criticism seems warranted, it is in the role of UNMAO in developing a
transitional strategy to hand over mandate and responsibilities to the Southern Sudan
Demining Commission and national authorities after 2011. …overall management of the
sector by UNMAO has been generally highly regarded. But efforts to coordinate with
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GoSS and the SSDC as well as the other commissions were less successful and have not
generated the expected results”.63
It is clear that capacity development, despite being included in all key documents that
make up the normative framework for the capacity development/transition process of
the Sudan mine action programme, was not viewed as a priority when focusing on
“getting the job done”. The Sudan MAP was faced with considerable pressure to open
key routes allowing humanitarian aid to be transported by road rather by air. In this
context, priority was not put on developing the capacity of the national counterparts. In
addition, capacity development responsibilities were not included in any of the UNMAO
staff’s ToR in the first few years. Even in June 2011, most UNMAO staff had no capacity
development provisions in their ToR. Consequently, the lack of clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for capacity development activities resulted in few personnel
“volunteering” to make the extra effort to involve relevant personnel of the NMAC and
the SSDA in their work. One evaluation of UNDP’s capacity development project has
also highlighted doubts as to whether UNMAS personnel have the necessary skills and
aptitudes to train and mentor national counterparts.64 With pressure from the UNMIS
and a busy schedule accrediting, tasking, coordinating and quality assuring operators,
capacity development activities were sidelined from the beginning of the programme.
Some respondents have pointed out that they believe a stronger focus on capacity
development would have “slowed down productivity”.
Recommendation: If UNMAS personnel are expected to be involved in capacity

development activities, this needs to be taken into consideration during the recruitment
and selection processes to ensure the selected personnel have relevant skills. Capacity
development roles and responsibilities should be explicitly defined in relevant ToR and
job descriptions and staff should be required to report on these activities. This would
help clarify who is responsible for what and it would avoid the risk of capacity
development being marginalised as an objective and viewed as an area that is not
included in “getting the job done”. This way, capacity development would not be an
option that can be ignored, but a requirement, just like any other responsibility.
COMPETITION AMONG UN AGENCIES

A number of individuals – national as well as international, in both northern and
southern Sudan – highlighted problems related to “UN internal fighting” –. Many SSDA
personnel seemed puzzled by the bad relationship between UNMAS and UNDP, and
were surprised at the visible tensions and open confrontations among some personnel.
In particular, people highlighted tensions between a previous UNMAS programme
manager and a UNDP CTA as a problem. Some pointed out that these clashes were
mainly “personality driven,” whereas others suspect that they were “trickle down
63
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effects” of tensions between UNDP and UNMAS at HQ level.
That broader tensions existed in the recent past between UNDP and UNMAS HQ is no
secret, and many UN staff in Sudan believe these affected the relationship between
these agencies at field level. One respondent pointed out that a key aspect of UNDP’s
and UNICEF’s way of working was that they “put the government in the front and took a
step back.” The same respondent also pointed out that in the UNMAO set-up, however,
the UNMAS dominance meant that the UN took a leading role and the government took
a step back. In their view, this was “contradicting the CPA,” which clearly sets out that
the UN should be supporting the government. It is worth noting, however, that a
number of individuals reported that the relationship between UNMAS and UNDP at HQ
level has improved dramatically since mid-2011, something many put down to changes
in senior staff.
It is apparent that UN internal conflicts made collaboration within UNMAO difficult;
something pointed out by representatives from SSDA, NMAC, UN agencies and national
and international NGOs. UNICEF and UNDP personnel stated that they felt sidelined and
undermined by the many UNMAS personnel, arguing that the dominance of UNMAS
personnel within the UNMAO instilled a military-like culture in the organisation. This, at
times, prevented UNMAO from establishing good working relationships with the
national mine action authorities, civil society, development organisations, government
ministries, and the broader humanitarian community.
The fact that UNDP and UNICEF personnel refer to UNMAS as being UNMAO indicates
to what extent UNMAS was perceived to dominate UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff
member described the UNDP – UNMAS relationship as “UNDP is from Venus and
UNMAS is from Mars” – referring to UNMAS often being perceived as the more
“martial, militant and harsher” UN agency, while UNDP is the “softer, more feminine”
agency. It appears that UNDP and UNMAS often looked at the same issue but saw
different things, coming up with different, often opposing strategies and plans for
solving those issues. Some respondents pointed out that a “lack of division of labour”
constituted one key source of conflict between UN agencies.
Another issue relates to a lack of clarity in how the UN inter-agency policy assigns
responsibilities to the various UN agencies. As mentioned earlier, this policy designates
UNDP as the lead agency to support capacity development activities. Conversely,
UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning of the transfer of programme
management responsibilities to national authorities and, in cooperation with other UN
mine action team agencies, to advise governments on the development of mine action
institutions and legislation and to assist in developing capacity and institution building
plans.
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It seems these policy statements have contributed to conflicts and confusion between
the two agencies. UNDP as an institution has expertise in creating an enabling
environment through the development of necessary legal, policy and regulatory
frameworks, which are critical to enabling NMAAs to carry out their mandated
functions. The role of UNMAS in providing complementary technical know-how and
expertise at an operations level and through concrete on-the-job training is an equally
essential component of the transition and capacity development package.
Despite these issues, UNMAO successfully managed to develop a number of important
planning documents such as the multi-year work plans and the transition plans. It is also
important to note that, without the strong mandate of UNMAO through UNMIS and the
UNSCR 1590, mine action would probably not have received the attention it did
immediately after the CPA. Thanks to considerable funding from the assessed budget
and other mechanisms, clearance operations were quickly organised and implemented.
Recommendation: To ensure the UN agencies’ comparative advantages and areas of

expertise complement each other in unambiguous ways, we recommend the UN interagency policy be reviewed. In addition to the UN inter-agency policy, we recommend
that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the agencies involved agree upon a
memorandum of understanding which clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of
the different agencies in that specific context. Finally, we recommend that capacity
development roles and responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant
personnel, which will require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different
roles and responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders
involved.
HIGH UN SALARIES: CHALLENGES IN ABSORBING AND RETAINING
COMPETENT STAFF

While the issue of salary discrepancies between the UN and governmental agencies is
not unique to the mine action sector, numerous respondents argued that the high
salaries paid to Sudanese UNMAO personnel led to difficulties in absorbing them into
the NMAC and the SSDA. Many highlighted that salary discrepancies represent a key
obstacle for national authorities to recruiting the most qualified and competent
individuals. Also mentioned was that some national personnel prefer working with UN
agencies and international NGOs because of the greater professional opportunities that
are perceived to exist with those agencies.
Recommendation: A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan MAP also highlighted the issue of

high UNMAO salaries as a key challenge in absorbing national staff working with
UNMAO into the SSDA and NMAC.65 That report recommended that UNMAS and
UNOPS consider this issue when first designing and starting up a new programme. It
further advised UNMAS/UNOPS to consider having the government entity hire the
65
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national staff directly, with the UN providing funds to increase the salaries of these
individuals by entering into a contract with the NMAA. Apparently, this has been done
in some countries to avoid the problem of absorbing national staff from UN agencies
into the NMAA.
STAFF RETENTION

Many respondents stated that the high turnover of national and expatriate personnel
represented a key challenge to capacity development. There are many examples of
individuals benefiting from capacity development efforts only to leave shortly after
training, resulting in a lack of continuity and missed opportunities for the national mine
action authorities to reap the benefits from capacity development activities. This also
points to the challenge of developing institutional capabilities rather than individual
capacities, which is less sustainable. Many respondents highlighted how the sudden
departure of one senior SSDA staff member affected the Authority, as her competency,
knowledge and experience were greatly missed by fellow SSDA colleagues and external
partners. This particular staff member moved to another government ministry so the
GoSS continued benefiting from her competencies and skills, but it was a big loss for
SSDA. As for NMAC, high staff turnover was to a large extent the result of some staff
being secondees from the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Many of these had to leave
NMAC on short notice due to internal MoD arrangements.
DEDICATION, COMMITMENT AND INTENTION TO LEARN IS KEY FOR
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION

At the risk of stating the obvious, a certain level of dedication, commitment and
willingness to share and to learn is a necessary precondition for any capacity
development effort. Without this, millions of USD can be spent with little progress
sustained. Numerous examples highlight how high levels of commitment and
motivation have resulted in strengthened capacity. Conversely, other examples
illustrate how a lack of commitment and motivation has seriously hampered capacity
development. The extent and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of Sudanese
authorities – external agencies can only assist and support.
TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING

Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development.
Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened trust,
whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: NMAC
Transition should have been made a priority at an earlier stage
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Many respondents argued that a key problem with the transition/capacity development
process was that it should have been given more resources and recognition at an earlier
stage: “The UN should have been serious about transition earlier”. A number of NMAC
staff pointed out that, prior to the T5 workshop, the relationship between NRMAO and
NMAC used to be “quite bad”, with poor information sharing and a lack of transparency.
Some NMAC staff also highlighted that they used to be under the impression that
NRMAO “was not so keen in helping out and in developing the capacity”.
T5 transition workshop/plan

As previously mentioned, the T5 workshop and the subsequent transition report were
highly regarded by many who worked with NMAC and UNMAO in June 2011. The
workshop clarified the transition process and what needed to be done, and the resulting
transition plan served as a basis for updating and refining the transition matrix,
specifying activities, timelines, roles and responsibilities. They also pointed out that the
workshop increased confidence within NMAC in how to plan and to reach specific goals.
The workshop also strengthened the trust between NMAC and NRMAO, as NMAC staff
felt that UNMAO was committed to helping them develop their capacities. Clearly, the
T5 workshop and the transition plan were important in initiating a more concrete
transition process.
The transition matrix

While the transition workshops and plans were important aspects of the capacity
development and transition process, the development of the transition matrices were
key in clarifying how to achieve the goals set out in transition plans. The matrices
stipulated the activities that had to be carried out, which element of the transition plan
each corresponded to, the status of the activity (planned, ongoing or completed), the
individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion. Transition plans are of little
concrete value without clearly defining such points. While transition plans have served
as guiding documents, it was the matrices that stipulated how to achieve what, how, by
whom and by when. The development of the matrices is therefore a key lesson learnt,
and we recommend that transition plans should always be accompanied by concrete
implementation plans.
Collocation

The collocation of NRMAO with NMAC in early 2011 strengthened capacity
development/transition activities and represented a turning point in the process at
NMAC. Many NRMAO and NMAC personnel stated it was the collocation that truly
kicked off the capacity development process, making transition more “real.” Collocation
signalled to NMAC that NRMAO “was serious about transition” and it was willing to
assist. It is clear that collocation facilitated the following:
o building trust between NMAC and NRMAO
o coordination
o collaboration
o information sharing
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o transparency
o on-the-job training
A number of challenges had to be overcome for collocation to happen. Willingness and
commitment by UNMAO and NMAC directors were preconditions. Many respondents
said the capacity of the NMAC would have been considerably higher had collocation
taken place at an earlier stage. Senior NMAC and UNMAO personnel underlined that the
delay of the collocation was a lesson learnt; it should have happened in 2010.
Information sharing and transparency

In terms of financial transparency, information sharing led to greater trust between the
NMAC director and senior management in UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff member
underlined that taking the time to sit down with the NMAC director, go through the
finances and the UNMAO budget, and explaining each budget line improved their
relationship considerably. Enhancing trust is essential for any capacity development
process.
Adapt to national procedures, rather than transferring the “UN way” of doing
things

It appears there was a tendency to simply transfer the “UN way” of doing things to
certain areas of responsibilities of the NMAC. While there are international standards
which need to be followed for, say, the technical areas of accreditation and quality
assurance, many of NMAC’s responsibilities need to comply with the “government way”
of doing things. For example, one area highlighted as particularly relevant was that of
procurement. NMAC’s procurement is managed through the Ministry of Humanitarian
Affairs, and a number of respondents pointed out that the focus on “UN ways of doing”
procurement would not result in a sustainable structure since UN procedures are often
incompatible with the GoS’ procedures. The failure to adapt to the government
procedures that guide many areas of NMAC’s activities resulted in challenges for the
GoS in assuming ownership of the MAP. One respondent also pointed out that the
transition plan was made by assessing the situation through “UN lenses” and failed to
recognise how the NMAC operates.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: SSDA
Commitment and motivation are key

Many respondents viewed the main challenge to capacity development as the lack of
commitment and motivation among some SSDA personnel. Basic work ethics such as
attendance, showing-up for arranged meetings and completing assigned tasks were
highlighted as issues that hamper any meaningful capacity development activities.
Many have indicated particular problems at the middle-management level. There is a
widespread belief that some of the main donors are losing confidence in the SSDA and
want to see evidence of improvement in line with the money invested. Commitment
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and political buy-in are preconditions for success in capacity development. The extent
and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of South Sudanese authorities; NPA, UN
agencies, GICHD, etc. can only support.
Many respondents stated that some senior UNMAO personnel displayed no
commitment to capacity development. In fact, some (both from the UNMAS and from
SSDA) argued that capacity development was “actively discouraged” by UNMAO
management for a number of years, resulting in tension between SSDA and UNMAO.
Most respondents highlighted that the mid-2010 change of UNMAO management,
which was a conscious decision from UNMAS HQ, resulted in dramatic improvements in
relations between SSDA and UNMAO, with a strengthened focus on capacity
development.
Recommendation: A rigorous performance based system needs to be formally

established, with regular (at least annual) assessments of all personnel. This would
contribute to improved organisational performance. All ToR and job descriptions should
be reviewed to ensure these accurately reflect the requirements and responsibilities of
the organisation. A code of conduct should be created and circulated to all personnel.
For these measures to be effective, there needs to be buy in and support from SSDA’s
senior management.
The influence of nepotism, tribalism and political appointments on the
effectiveness and professionalism of SSDA

Many stated that nepotism and tribalism reduce the effectiveness of the SSDA. There is
a widespread view that several SSDA personnel have been appointed because of family
and tribal ties or for connections within the SPLA, and not because they have the
necessary skills and experience. Another issue is the SSDA’s political appointees, as
there is a risk of politicisation of SSDA’s activities. This obviously has consequences on
any capacity development activities as the “right people” are not necessarily in the
“right positions”. It appears that SSDA’s ability to select employees based on merit is
limited.
Recommendation: Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and

rigorous to ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies,
experience and skills. It is important that SSDA has a combination of sector-specific skills
and expertise as well as core functional skills such as basic public financial management.
No separation between the Authority and the mine action centre

One challenge for the SSDA is that there is no clear separation between the Authority
and the MAC. As highlighted previously, the SSDA is responsible both for broad policy
decisions and for overseeing mine action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level.
Many respondents argued that multiple problems stem from the lack of separation
between the Authority and the MAC, including confusion related to the SSDA mandate
and the politicisation activities. NPA was one organisation that advocated for a
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separation between the Authority and the MAC. NPA has shared concrete suggestions
to the SSDA, clearly illustrating how the two areas can be separated in a straightforward manner.
As well, the importance of separating the authority and the MAC was highlighted in two
other evaluations.66 IMAS 02.1067 presents clear advice on how this can be achieved.
Recommendation: To clarify SSDA’s mandate, we recommend that the operational

and authority levels be separated.
Transition plan

It is clear that the experience from the T5 workshop and the subsequent preparation of
the transition plan in southern Sudan was in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. A
key problem was that the pre-T6 transition plans were unrealistic, portraying levels of
national ownership that did not reflect the reality. Most respondents said the transition
plan was not a useful document. Other key flaws included:
o no concrete, SMART action points
o no indicators of the different degrees of national ownership of the transition
plan
Many stated the delay in drafting and distributing of the transition as another problem.
This led some SSDA personnel to disassociate themselves from what previously had
been agreed, with momentum lost. In combination with the above problems, the lack of
a realistic work plan and matrix accompanying it meant there has been little practical
implementation of the transition plan. Subsequently, the June 2011 T6 workshop was
significant because frank and honest discussions took place about the actual degrees of
national ownership, leading to a more realistic transition plan. In addition, the T6
transition plan was distributed within a few days of the T6 workshop.
Recommendation: To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from

transition plans, and to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we
recommend that future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the
workshops as possible.
A concrete capacity development work plan and a “matrix of transitional activities”,
similar to that developed at NMAC, are necessary complements to the transition plan.
These clarify the capacity development/transition roles and responsibilities, activities,
responsible person(s) and deadlines.
Collocation
66
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Despite talk of collocation, no UNMAS personnel were permanently located with the
SSDA as of late 2011. The NMAC example clearly demonstrates that collocation can
have positive results, speeding the capacity development process considerably.
Challenges related to collocation do exist; a lack of a regular supply of electricity was
highlighted as one. However, commitment from senior managers on both sides of the
partnership would result in dealing with challenges in a proactive and pragmatic manner.
Recommendation: We recommend that UNMACC learn from the positive experience

at NMAC. While recognising that northern Sudan provided a very different context to
that of South Sudan, lessons can still be learnt, particularly in relation to how to
overcome challenges.
On-the-job training

While some on-the-job training has taken place, particularly with SSDA quality
assurance and IMSMA officers, where close working relationships between UNMACC
and SSDA have been established, it is clear that much more could have been done.
Recommendation: On-the-job training needs to be included in a work plan and

stipulated in relevant UNMACC staff ToRs.
Collaboration between the UN and NPA

As stated above, NPA has been a key actor in the capacity development efforts ever
since UNDP requested its assistance in 2010. The collaboration between NPA and
UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO playing an instrumental role in securing
donor funding for NPA’s capacity development project.
This provides a positive example of good team spirit between different actors who
recognise each other's advantages and strengths, with UN agencies proactively
engaging with NGOs. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice, and we
recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in other countries.
Organisational capacity development

Despite efforts from various organisations involved in capacity development, it appears
that SSDA’s capacity has seen very limited improvements. Although an organigram, job
descriptions and set of ToRs have been developed, along with a number of process
documents, SSDA’s organisational structures remain weak. Many SSDA personnel have
attended middle and senior management courses in Jordan and the U.S. over the years,
but it is difficult to detect the benefit of these courses on SSDA.
Recommendation: Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources

required for the implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of
services need to be strengthened considerably for SSDA to assume its responsibilities.
Also, organisational structures and procedures should be further formalised and
59

clarified to ensure SSDA’s performance is not dependent on individuals, but on solid
standard operating procedures.
Ensure a Holistic and Strategic Approach to Capacity Development

As the world’s newest country, South Sudan now receives considerable state building
support from a range of international actors. The SSDP is an important document,
presenting South Sudan’s development priorities through 2013. The SSDA and UNMAO
did an excellent job in ensuring the inclusion of mine action within the plan’s security
pillar. Capacity development has been made a national development priority under the
responsibility of the GoSS, and the medium-term capacity development strategy serves
as a guiding document in this regard.
Recommendation: Ensure that the development of South Sudan’s Mine Action

Authority’s capacity is integrated with the national capacity development process and
aligned with national development priorities and policies. We recommend that SSDA’s
capacity development partners use the momentum of the development of the SSDP and
work with other national and international stakeholders to ensure their efforts are
informed by an ongoing dialogue. While there are specific skill-sets and expertise that
are unique to mine action, mine action capacity development partners can benefit
greatly from the capacity development expertise that is available in other sectors. This
would facilitate collaboration and information sharing among partners, while ensuring
that capacity development efforts are driven as a national process, aligned with national
priorities, processes and plans. Also, as highlighted in the medium-term capacity
development strategy, partners need to be attentive to the absorptive capacity of
national institutions to apply complex capacity development programmes that
represent “international best practice.” Therefore we recommend realism, with a focus
on what is needed and manageable from the perspective of South Sudan’s mine action
authority.
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Elhassan Ali
Siral Kutim Abdalrhman
Nuha Awad
Mohammed Eltaieb Ahmed
Abdelazim Elshiekh Fagir
Paul Heslop

Title
Chairperson
Director General
IMSMA Officer
Chief IMSMA Officer
Programme Director
Regional Quality Assurance Officer
Deputy Director
Capayity Development Technical Advisor
IMSMA Officer
Regional Quality Assurance Officer
Logistics Coordinaor
Programme Manager
Ex-Technical Advisor
Programme Director
Regional IM Advvisor
Operations Manager
Programme Manager
Project Manager
SSR Officer
Deputy Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator
Former Director
Former CHIEF Technical Advisor
Deputy Director
Director
Programme Officer
Director
Programme Officer
Head of MRE Department
IMSMA Officer
Logistics Officer
VA Associate
Operations Officer
Training officer & programme assistant
Programme Unit Chief

Organisation
SSDA
SSDA
SSDA
SSDA
SSDA
SSDA
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
EC
UNDP
DDG
NPA
MTI
MTI
G4S
UNMIS
UN
UNMAO
UNDP
FSD
SIMAS
MAG
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
NMAC
UNMAS
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Programme Manager
Regional Operations Coordinator
Northern Region Programme Officer
MRE/VA Regional Officer
Regional IMSMA Officer
Consultant
Ex-Chief of Operations
Ex-Programme Manager
Child Protection Specialist (MA)
Country Programme Manager
General Manager

UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAO
UNMAS
UNICEF
MAG
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ANNEX 2
TIME-LINE: SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
Year
Event
2001
SPLA/M signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines
and for Cooperation in Mine Action
2002
Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement signed
2002
Emergency Mine Action Programme established by UNMAS
2003
Establishment of a national mine action office in Khartoum and the new Sudan Mine Action Directorate
in Nairobi
2003
Sudan signed and ratified the APMBC
2004
APMBC entered into force on 1 April
2004
First versions of the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine
Action Policy Framework were signed
2004
Signature of the Declaration in Nairobi
2004
United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) established
2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed
2005
UNMIS established by UNSCR 1590
2005
Sudan’s NMAA established by Presidential Decree No. 299
2006
Regional mine action centre (RMAC) changed name to Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) by
Presidential Decree No. 45
2006
National Mine Action Strategic Framework updated and endorsed by Presidential Decree No. 283
2007
Sudan signed the CRPD
2008
First transition workshop organised in Nairobi in February, as per the 2006 Strategic Framework
2008
Second transition workshop held in Nairobi in May
2008
Third transition workshop held in Khartoum in August
2008
Fourth transition meeting held in Juba in November
2009
Starting point for implementation of transition plan in January
2009
Sudan ratified the CRPD
2010
Fifth transition workshop (T5) held in Khartoum in May
2010
“Transition team” (UNDP, UNMAS and NPA) created in southern Sudan
2010
T5 Transition Plan distributed in February
2010
Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law in March, by Presidential Decree No. 51
2011
Referendum on unity of Sudan or secession of South Sudan in 7 February, As per clause 2.533 of the CPA
2011
T5 transition workshop held in Juba
2011
South Sudan became independent on 9 July
2011
UNMIS and UNMAO’s mandate expired
2011
UNSCR 1996 mandated the establishment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Mine
Action Coordination Center, as from 1 September,
2011
South Sudan acceded to the APMBC on 11 November
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ANNEX 3
SUMMARY OF VTF AND ASSESSED BUDGET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUDAN
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 2003 - 201068

SUDAN PROGRAMME - INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES PER YEAR AND SOURCE (2003-2010) - Except Darfur
INCOMES

EXPENDITURES

VTF

TOTAL

2003
4.001.087
VTF

PKAB

2004

6.077.799
VTF
2005
15.584.359
VTF

2.147.180
PKAB
Coordination
4.386.004
Operations
9.865.581

14.251.585
PKAB
Coordination
6.304.914
Operations
22.353.786

2006

9.799.178
VTF

28.658.700
PKAB
Coordination
6.655.489
Operations
26.719.849

2007

17.318.342
VTF

33.375.338
PKAB
Coordination
9.136.934
Operations
30.588.866

2008

24.447.504
VTF

39.725.800
PKAB
Coordination
11.856.665
Operations
29.028.386

2009

10.730.506
VTF
2010

TOTAL

68

40.885.051
PKAB
Coordination
13.011.024
Operations
31.854.576

8.006.051
95.964.826

44.865.600
203.909.254

VTF

Coordination
2.331.207
Operations
1.454.746
4.001.087 TOTAL
3.785.953
VTF
TOTAL
Coordination
2.143.176
TA / CB
2.099.079
Tech. Survey
487.999
Clearance
2.850.881
Victim Assistance
76.335
8.224.979 TOTAL
7.657.470
TOTAL
VTF
Coordination
4.016.272
TA / CB
3.241.982
Clearance
9.304.960
MRE
841.196
29.835.944 TOTAL
17.404.410
TOTAL
VTF
Coordination /TA
2.129.547
Integr. Surv./Clear.
3.775.171
Clearance
1.854.734
Route Ver./Clear.
1.226.514
LIS
743.750
MRE
265.020
38.457.878 TOTAL
9.994.736
VTF
TOTAL
Coordination /TA
3.577.913
Integr. Surv./Clear.
6.814.768
Route Ver./Clear.
4.418.000
LIS
1.588.033
MRE
413.102
50.693.680 TOTAL
16.811.816
VTF
TOTAL
Coordination /TA
6.878.106
Integr. Surv./Clear. 10.151.065
Victim Assistance
821.614
LIS
947.441
MRE
201.586
64.173.304 TOTAL
18.999.812
TOTAL
VTF
Coordination /TA
4.818.177
Integr. Surv./Clear. 17.708.428
Victim Assistance
1.261.179
LIS
777.498
MRE
659.518
51.615.557 TOTAL
25.224.800
TOTAL
VTF
Coordination /TA
4.262.293
Integr. Surv./Clear.
6.782.328
Victim Assistance
1.295.287
MRE
515.618
52.871.651 TOTAL
12.855.526
299.874.080
112.734.523

TOTAL

3.785.953
TOTAL

PKBA
Coordination
Operations

798.120
1.023.658

1.821.778
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

4.082.291
9.128.587

13.210.878
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

30.615.288
TOTAL

3.880.485
13.758.081

17.638.566
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

27.633.302
TOTAL

6.655.489
26.719.849

33.375.338
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

50.187.154
TOTAL

9.735.573
32.593.007

42.328.580
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

61.328.392
TOTAL

12.474.452
30.540.900

43.015.352
PKBA
Coordination
Operations

9.479.248
TOTAL

68.240.152
TOTAL

11.767.944
28.811.174

40.579.118
191.969.610

53.434.644
304.704.133

Information from UNMAO
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